THE REVIEW OF RELIGION

Volume XII JANUARY, 1948 Number 2

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The Review of Religion is published bi-monthly during the eight months of the academic year (November, January, March and May). Subscriptions: $3.00 a year (foreign, $3.30); single copies 80 cents (foreign, 90 cents). All subscriptions and business matters should be addressed to the publisher, Columbia University Press, 2960 Broadway, New York City. Manuscripts, editorial communications and books for review should be addressed to the Editorial Office, 401 Low Memorial Library, Columbia University, New York City.

The articles in *The Review of Religion* are indexed in the *International Index to Periodicals*, New York City.

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EDITOR'S NOTE

IN THIS NUMBER *The Review of Religion* again publishes papers on a single theme which come from a Columbia University Seminar on Religion. The theme this time is *Religion and Democracy,* and some brief data regarding the Seminar concerned with it are given on the following page by the Chairman of the group, Professor Salo W. Baron, of the Department of History. The book reviews included in this number were not all of them prepared in connection with the Seminar, but they were selected as being relevant to its theme.

The University Seminar on Religion is one of a number of interdepartmental seminars launched by the Graduate Faculties of Columbia University in 1945. Its purpose over the years is to study various aspects of religion in their relation to different human concerns and institutions of enduring interest and importance. At present the University Seminar on Religion comprises two groups, one of which is investigating relations of Religion and Health, and the other of Religion and Democracy. Some papers coming from the first group were published by *The Review of Religion* in its May 1946 issue, and in this number the papers offered come from the second group. The Seminar in both its branches is administratively responsible to a Joint Committee of Columbia University and Union Theoolgical Seminary under the Dean of the Graduate Faculties.

HORACE L. FRIESS, *Editor*

FOREWORD

THE FOLLOWING SUMMARIES AND PAPERS have come out of fortnightly discussions held at the University Seminar on Religion and Democracy of Columbia University during the academic year 1946-1947. The following members participated more or less regularly: Joseph L. Blau, Mrs. J. B. Brebner, John C. Bennett, Richard W. Day, John Dillenberger, E. E. Elder, William J. Fitzgerald, Horace L. Friess, William Haller, Carlton J. H. Hayes, John David Hughey, Jr., F. Ernest Johnson, Max Laserson, Carl Mayer, John T. McNeill, Reinhold Niebuhr, Albert Salomon, Herbert W. Schneider, and Roger L. Shinn. Mr. Paul Abrecht served as Secretary and the undersigned as Chairman.

The summaries here given of papers dealing with one or another historical phase in the interrelations between religion and democracy represent, in part, the discussions of the group as a whole which followed the original presentation. Only a few papers discussing contemporary aspects are printed here in full as submitted by their authors. It is hoped that some of the historical analyses, together with several others which may be discussed at the Seminar during the present academic year, will be included in a later publication.

The members of the Seminar pointed out early and repeatedly that democracy has no standard definition, and that one of the aims of these discussions would be to clarify the various ways in which the concept is used in different contexts. As a convenient rule, with historical precedent, it was agreed to regard the ideas of the French Revolution, liberty, equality, and fraternity, as historically central to the development of democracy. The discussions, therefore, aimed to show how these three concepts appear and function in various religious movements.

SALO W. BARON, *Chairman*

RELIGION AND DEMOCRACY: A GROUP INQUIRY

I

JUDAISM AND DEMOCRACY*

TO WHAT EXTENT CAN RELIGION based on belief in a supernatural power and the sovereignty of God also accept the idea of democracy which places sovereignty in the hands of the people? This problem is particularly important for Judaism in relation to democracy because of the specific theocratic character of the second Jewish Commonwealth. As Josephus pointed out with respect to the ancient Jewish community:

> There is endless variety in the details of the customs and laws which prevail in the world at large. To give but a summary enumeration: some people have entrusted the supreme political power to monarchies, others to oligarchies, yet others to the masses. Our law giver, however, was attracted by none of these forms of polity, but gave to his constitution the form of what—if a forced expression be permitted—may be termed a "theocracy," a placing all sovereignty and authority in the hands of God.[1]

In practice, the theocracy placed authority (in the name of the sovereign God) in the hands of a religious class. In succession we find priests, scribes, and rabbis functioning as a ruling class. The practical problem, therefore, becomes how democratic were the successive administrations of these classes. As Rousseau charged Christianity with the tendency to make men submissive, so the Jewish theocracy has frequently been charged with making men too self-effacing, too submissive to a deity, producing a political development detrimental to the freedom of the people. Consequently it is justifiable to raise the

* This summary of an informal discussion held on the subject of the interrelations between Judaism and Democracy touches merely on a few crucial points of contact. Such aspects as the contributions of the Israelitic prophets to the development of egalitarian ethics, the doctrine of the Covenant and the much-quoted Old Testament denunciations of monarchical and aristocratic abuses were simply taken for granted. The main interest of the discussants centered about the practical operation of certain democratic institutions developed in later ancient and medieval Judaism and the restrictions imposed on them by the "theocratic" regime during the Second Commonwealth and by the more or less limited autonomy of the Jewish minorities in the lands of the Dispersion.

1. Josephus *Against Apion,* II, 165 in H. St. John Thackeray's translation.

question of whether or not there is in the Jewish and Christian tradition an essential conflict between theocracy and democracy.

Some characteristics of the life of the Jewish communities in the dispersion illustrate this conflict. In medieval times the Jews lived as tolerated minorities in the state, accepting the laws enacted by the kings of nations in which they resided. Holding that the "law of the Kingdom is law," the Jews recognized state law as valid and even administered it under the Rabbinic code. However, this rule applied only to Gentile kings and not to Jewish monarchs, the latter being expected to abide by the laws of Israel ". . . for all of Israel are partners in the land of Israel."[2] This non-autonomous, undemocratic submission of the Jewish communities to the ruling powers has to be viewed in terms of their interpretation of the dispersion—that it was the result of the sins of their forefathers. They prayed that the sins for which they had been driven from their own land would be removed and that they would some day be restored to the land of their inheritance. Thus the submission of the religious community was explained as a result of the divine wrath due to the people's disobedience of the divine law, and submission to the state was regarded as a kind of expiation for their disobedience.

Fraternity in Judaism is admittedly a mixture of universalism and nationalism: the belief of the Jews that they were the chosen people seems to conflict with the democratic principle of universal fraternity. Much depends on what is meant by the *chosen* people. But a greater problem from the standpoint of the criterion of fraternity is that of the double standard of morals and law applied to members versus non-members in all medieval religious communities. Like Canon and Muslim law, that of the rabbis ruled that the testimony of non-members in court was not of equal value with that of members. It was argued, believed, and practiced that Jews should not receive charity from non-Jews, although in the medieval period it was decided to accept money from outsiders but to use it quietly for non-Jews. This double standard was extended to business and other economic and social relationships. All this suggests that the medieval Jewish political hope was not a universal fraternalism, except in its ultimate messianic hope.

2. R. Nissim, 13th century.

The Jews were true universalists with respect to their pacificism, because in the dispersion they certainly did not support national wars which would have set Jewish community against Jewish community; rather they prayed for universal peace. As a result, during the religious wars they were pointed out as an example of a people whose faith did not involve them in war.

Since there are contradictory elements in the ideas of *liberty* and *equality*, an important question is, to what extent were these elements present in Judaism. In theory and practice the Jews were all equal, and from ancient times there were no permanent or durable class divisions. Wealth did not always carry over from one generation to the next. Each dispersion community was autonomously administered so that there was little of community concern which was not controlled by the popular assembly. Ordinances governing community relations were enacted by these assemblies, and only in rare instances were there regional bodies whose authority so extended over smaller communities that these were in effect disfranchised.

The popular assemblies were bodies which decided common problems, and they constitute a clear case of popular sovereignty and equality within the political unit. This was a political heritage from the days in ancient Palestine when the interpretation of the law had been a common function in which the people were interested and in which they participated in an informal and democratic way. The power of the king or state had never been significant in local communities because of their geographical separation, and they tended to be democratic in effect and creative of a law-minded attitude among members of the community. Contrary to the Weber thesis regarding the conflict between the Pharisee-represented urban democracy and the Sadducee-led peasant aristocracy, there was very little economic distinction between rural and urban classes in Palestine and, therefore, little community cleavage along these lines. In the period of the dispersion the communal groups of the Jews remained separate, isolated, small self-run groups with the popular assembly providing real democracy on the communal level. The manipulation of these assemblies was kept at a minimum, and public apathy toward their meetings was dealt with severely.

In addition to the popular assemblies, there were other egalitarian

devices which permitted the poorer members of the community to safeguard their welfare, for example, through the interruption of prayers when an appeal could be made to the whole community to secure redress of a grievance. There was no sex equality, but the Jewish treatment of women was, on the whole, more democratic than that accorded them in other medieval societies. While there was theoretical equality in the community, scholars as a class had unlimited privileges and, regardless of wealth or occupation, were tax exempt. Actually this inequality of status by learning was mitigated somewhat by the emphasis on equality of educational opportunity in the community. Education was compulsory for every male child, and this equality of opportunity was carried over into adult education.

It may be concluded from the experience of the Jewish community that there is a significant difference between the priestly and prophetic use of the concept of divine sovereignty which has a direct bearing on the question of whether or not there is an essential conflict between theocracy and democracy. The priestly theocracy is opposed to democracy in that it makes an explicit claim to rule by divine sanction, while the prophetic idea of the sovereignty of God challenges the implicit theocratic claims made by every governing class. From this standpoint religion is not opposed to democracy. In the book of Samuel and in the prophets, it is emphasized that the ruler or king stands under the judgment of God, and on the whole the rabbis seem to have used the concept in this prophetic rather than in the priestly manner.

Actually democracy may be as much in accord with theocracy as with any form of government, for the rule of God over a community may be through the community meeting of the believers, as Marsilio of Padua pointed out in his opposition to clericalism. Thus that which is theocratic emerges through action of the people. From this standpoint theocracy is neutral regarding the question of democracy.

A conflict between theocracy and democracy does arise in modern times where the secular roots of democracy make it antithetical to religion. Also, if we limit the meaning of theocracy to rule by a leader who has received a special charisma, the modern charismatic theocracies (Hitlerism and Fascism) are really secular forms of the charisma, and these are the greatest threat to democracy.

II

CATHOLICISM AND DEMOCRACY

There is an important contrast in the expression of democracy in Judaism and in Catholicism. In medieval Judaism there was much democracy but little emphasis on representative government, while in the Catholic orders the representative system was developed to a high degree. Though limited to a select and qualified community, these orders spread over a wide area and provided the only evidence of the existence of representative government on a large scale in the medieval period. Although this was only a crudely representative system, we need to investigate further its influence upon political developments in Europe.

The exact effect of the elective system of the Dominican orders on the history of Parliamentary government is uncertain. The cortes of Castille and Aragon can probably be shown to be by-products of Catholic representative ideas. Both allowed for a considerable degree of democratic expression in the election of the estates, particularly the common estates. The medieval Spanish practice of setting up popular courts to deal with certain economic and social questions (water rights, etc.) has continued down to this day, and it is significant that the limited democracy of the cortes disappeared coincidentally with the decay of religion.

The Roman Catholic Church is itself a mixture of democratic and undemocratic elements. While the Pope is absolute monarch of the Church, there is an aristocracy of cardinals and some democracy in the assemblies. But the Church is primarily an other-worldly society, placed in this world in order to struggle with it. It follows from the Catholic definition of the Church that it is superior to all forms of government, and that the state should enforce the will of the Church in matters of faith and morals. The Church views the state as both a result of sin and a remedy for sin, and state power is not looked upon as a supreme value in itself, but as a concession to evil.

While the Church has lived under all forms and kinds of governments and rulers, it has always maintained as its primary function the creation of an equalitarian fellowship of believers within which each man works for his own salvation (a perfect religious expression

of the ideas of equality, liberty and fraternity). The Church has, in addition and secondarily, been a political body, and from it the Protestants have taken over the doctrine of tyrannicide.

The concept of popular sovereignty was worked out by Catholic thinkers as part of the struggle against both popes and emperors, and constitutes a major contribution to the development of democratic thought. Though Catholic theory has not reconciled itself to the modern interpretation of democracy, it has in practice engaged in democratic politics. Catholic popularism has attempted to operate on the general theory of what social classes owe to each other, and this theory of reciprocal obligations goes back to the attempts of feudal contracts to formulate specific class rights and duties. Furthermore, Catholicism has been compelled by circumstances to oppose totalitarian politics in the name of a pluralistic society, but it has achieved no clear theory of group toleration, and, according to some of its exponents, it believes in toleration only as a temporary expedient. However, in general, there seems to be more democracy in Catholic practice than in Catholic theory.

III

LUTHERANISM AND DEMOCRACY

Lutheranism has made no obvious contribution to democratic political or social theory or to the democratic life of its own organization. Luther stressed spiritual liberty at the expense of political liberty, and the result was either political apathy or unquestioning duty and loyalty to the state. Justice was interpreted as social responsibility for one's neighbor and the duty of *caritas* in economic matters. However, Luther's attitude toward the question of property was more flexible than that of Catholicism.

A problem arose over the right of resistance by the magistrates and princes to the emperor, and before 1530 no such right was recognized. However, the notorious injustice of the emperor in religious matters finally led Luther to grant the right of the princes to rebel, though the people had to remain faithful to the prince. Although he thus granted the right of religious opposition to rulers, he condemned political opposition, using the argument that "one cannot be a judge in one's own cause." He held that there is no justification for revolution and

rebellion, whether by individuals or people as a whole. This unqualified rejection of the right of resistance made it very difficult for liberal political movements to develop in Lutheran territory.

Lutheranism's opposition to theocracy is its outstanding contribution to political thought. It means removal of any claims by the Church to interfere in government, and, at the same time, releases the political order from any subordination to the Church hierarchy. The political order is subject to its own law, which is established by the "reason" and cannot be governed by faith. This does not mean that the relation between ethics and politics is denied. There is no suspension of the natural law principle or the ethical responsibility of secular rule. However, Christian conscience comes into play only on the individual level, for the individual alone is accountable to God. The ruler is to be confronted with his responsibility before God and a Christian conscience. Obviously the danger in this position is the possibility of encouraging capitulation to brutal state power.

Lutheran social theory is based on the idea of the "calling," or the conception of intra-worldly asceticism. This idea is similar to the Calvinist position, but there are important differences. The strong traditionalistic interpretation of the social orders of the world within the Lutheran idea of the calling is in contrast to Calvinism. It took a conservative form as it relates to the place of the individual in the social hierarchy. The results of the Lutheran view of the social-economic order could be summarized briefly as follows: in the first place, the Lutheran contribution to the spirit of capitalism is almost nil. Secondly, it developed the idea of responsibility for social welfare in the modern world, a more paternalistic and benevolent policy of social care than is found in Calvinism. This attitude is apparent in Bismarck's social policy. Schmoller pointed out that the Prussian kings "took care of the poor." But when there was a conflict between political and social interests, the social had to yield.

While it made no direct contribution to democracy, Lutheranism has been able to associate itself with democratic communities. Its political and social theory enables it to come to terms with democracy, although it has a "hidden disinclination" for it. It is natural to have Lutheranism in undemocratic countries, while Lutheranism in democracies is a singular phenomenon based on fact, not theory. Moreover, Lutheranism combines more favorably with the conservative

democracies, while opposing radical democracies and revolutionary mass governments. This is essentially a re-establishment of the concept of Hellenic democracy.

It needs to be pointed out that Lutheranism did not contribute actively to the establishment of National Socialism, except in that it did not realize the gulf between the Nazi and Christian views which made compromise impossible. The experience of unqualified tyranny has had its effect, in that it has forced reconsideration of this attitude toward democracy and socialism. Scandinavian theologians are writing books today in an effort to prove that their interpretation of Lutheranism is the correct one as against the German. There is a change in attitude in contemporary German Lutheranism toward a true confessing church (the Niemöller wing). It favors democracy in the nation as well as in the Church, and emphasizes the function of the laity in the parish. But there is still a very conservative Lutheranism, particularly in Bavaria. Lutheranism in Russia also possesses this conservative character. Under the Czars it was the religion of the German minority, and, even more than the Orthodox Church, was regarded as a pillar of the existing order, for in the latter there was rebellion from time to time.

IV

CALVINISM AND DEMOCRACY

In a consideration of Calvinism and democracy it is important to distinguish between Calvin's own political ideas and attitudes and those of the later Calvinists. The democratic elements in Calvin's thought were an outgrowth of both his earlier humanistic and legal studies and his later theological work. Calvin's doctrines of the sovereignty of God and the state as the divine instrument for communal order were primary in his thought. "The right of government is ordained for the health of mankind." But Calvin also believed that the rulers were under God's judgment, and because princes so generally misused the power of government he opposed monarchy and favored the elective principle. However, so great was his fear of anarchy and chaos in the social order that he chose to limit the right of rebellion to the subordinate magistrates who were elected by the people. His choice of government was "aristocracy, or aristocracy tempered by

democracy." Calvin followed constitutional methods in his own political activities in the Genevan republic. He was a firm believer in *liberty* ("an inestimable good"), though he was not an *egalitarian* or a leveller in property but believed that men are broadly equal in sharing God's gifts in nature and a common need of salvation from sin. He habitually teaches *fraternity,* and here he is primarily religious and scriptural.

Natural Law: Calvinism's attitude toward natural law is somewhat difficult to determine. On the one hand, the Calvinists insisted that because of sin natural law must be supplemented by divine revealed law. Therefore scriptural texts are as practical as guides to moral action as are the directives of natural law. On the other hand, Calvin believed that the Ten Commandments are a part of the natural law. The problem as Calvin saw it was that though the law is adequate men do not live up to it. There is also the Reformation idea that one cannot simply depend on the natural law of reason, that we need another law. It is true that when Calvin relies on Scripture he is talking about salvation, not mundane ethical matters. The Scriptures are the revelation of the way to salvation, but even in moral matters reason is weakened by sin.

The "sons of Calvin": The "sons of Calvin" were to the left of their theological father. In France the Calvinists asserted the principle of resistance to the monarchy with determination, and, on the whole, the French were more liberal and democratic than Calvin. Ponet first developed the idea of triangular covenant: God and king; people and God; people and king.

While in many cases the Calvinists followed their founder's ideas, they also drew upon their studies in classical and scholastic writers for their political teaching. Although Calvin's arguments from the "ephors" (ancient subordinate magistrates) was a stock part of the writings of all his followers, they developed his theory of elective magistrates to its fullest implications of rule by the people.

English democracy seems to be based upon the ideas of the "sons of Calvin," while American democracy rests to an important degree upon the ideas of Calvin himself. Madison and even more, John Adams, seem to have been influenced more by Calvin's theology and concepts of human nature than by the later Calvinist political theory. The Genevan system of checks by the Councils and the suspicion of

popular rule served as models for our constitution. As a general proposition the "Bill of Rights School" in American political theory follows the "sons of Calvin," whereas the constitutional school (Adams, Madison, Hamilton) represents Calvin's own ideas.

To what extent the doctrine of predestination can be considered anti-democratic is a difficult question. Using the word in a strictly soteriological sense, Calvin would say that the doctrine of predestination would have no bearing on mundane problems, but actually this doctrine did favor an exaggerated respect for constituted government. Providence was regarded as a form of earthly predestination, and the idea was used to sanction inequities in wealth. The concept of divine predestination in Calvin goes beyond the soteriological. It was pointed out as an example of the concrete application of predestinarianism that the Calvinist preaching in the Long Parliament adapted the doctrine of election to the situation very easily. The members of the Long Parliament were regarded as "saints," having a special calling to achieve the salvation of England.

Calvin's belief that the magistrates were given their office by God and ought to fight the king who violated his obligations to the people had some democratic implications. The important point is that the practical principle of electing lower magistrates, though their office was of God, was extended to cover the whole form of government. Buchanan and Rutherford were two who extended this idea of election as government given by God, with the form being determined by the people. Henderson was another radical Calvinist who aimed his tracts *(Lex Rex)* at those Presbyterians and Scots who had formerly approved of rule by majority but who, when they gained political power, opposed it. John Knox also popularized the idea of triangular covenant which Ponet had developed in France. The Scottish sovereigns were forced to recognize the existence of instruments of expression of popular sovereignty. Later these expressions were transferred to the English scene, and lawyers were taught them in textbook form. Gradually these ideas were accepted in England, although they were still regarded as subversive on the continent.

On the whole, Calvin's predestinarian theology does not appear to have been a serious obstacle to the radical political views of later Calvinists. It appears to have had some influence on his own views of political and social status, though it was not an unqualified acceptance

of earthly conditions. Calvin's suspicion of absolute or unqualified democracy may be explained by his pessimistic view of human nature and his fear of factional disruption.

V

ERASMUS AND FREEDOM

The ideas of Erasmus were of special significance both for Catholicism and for the social ideas of the Renaissance. He was actively interested in social and economic matters, and some aspects of his thought contributed to the idea of social democracy. He defended urbanized society and the economic function of bankers, and praised the laboring classes as the chief support of the family and the state, while attacking the leisure classes who squandered the country's economic wealth, and the princes who would destroy the freedom and liberties of the people. He showed sympathy for social revolution, though favoring the status quo because it preserved the peace. He deplored the outrages of the nobles in their victory over the peasants, but said that Luther was to blame for misleading them.

Concerning the state, Erasmus argued that monarchy easily becomes despotic and favored constitutional checks on the king. He urged mutual respect between princes and people, and advocated the development of local self government. He developed the concept of the Christian republic with Christ as its head, which would transcend the temporal sphere and its rulers. He recognized the impending end of the Holy Roman Empire and the rise of national states, with the resultant danger from rivalry and wars between them. To prevent this he urged the co-operation of Christian princes through the mediation of the pope. In other words, Erasmus accepted the fact of the disappearance of the old empire, although he did not like the narrow national sovereignties which replaced it. He wanted a Christian league of nations and thought it was the duty of the Holy See to establish it.

VI

PURITANISM AND DEMOCRACY

The distinctive democratic contributions of Puritanism present a special problem. The Puritan preachers would not have called their

ideas democratic. They set forth in vivid popular fashion the Puritan version of the Christian epic, dwelling upon the nature and the mode of faith as the experience of the justified and the sanctified life, e.g., Bunyan's *Grace Abounding Unto Sinners.* The sermons emphasized the temptation and the fall of the first Adam and the redemption through the Second Adam. There was considerable stress on the historical books of the Old Testament to illustrate the need to rise up and cast off false kings, but the emphasis on the spiritual warfare with temptation and victory of redemption was without special reference to the government of the church or the state. The Puritan sermons stressed the New Testament theme of the calling as an individual and personal experience. The parable of the talents was most frequently used in this manner. Weber's thesis that Calvinist emphasis on such ideas as this parable provided support for the prevailing economic spirit is true enough, but not sufficient evidence for his more general thesis that Calvin's ideas produced capitalism.

Though the Puritans were primarily a preaching order within the Church, the Puritan preachers were speaking to the House of Commons in a revolutionary situation. The struggle with the crown was dramatized as a struggle against Satan and the anti-Christs, whose agents, the bishops, silence the preachers and the press. In their opposition to the bishops, the preachers were led to condone resistance to the crown by force of arms.

In contrast to the Scots, who had very definite ideas of Church government, the Puritans emphasized the erection of a godly preaching ministry. When the Scottish reformers talked of freedom they meant control of the Church by the clergy against the crown. When the English Puritans talked about freedom they meant the right of everyone to have his say about the Scriptures. They believed that, after everyone had had an opportunity to say what he believed, unity would be established. Actually it was this tradition which later made unity impossible, and the theory of Presbyterianism which they eventually supported was in contradiction to their tradition. The Puritans were more successful in establishing a free pulpit than they realized. They undermined the position of the clerical caste. The popularization of the Scriptures had effected a kind of equality which disposed of all mediation between the individual and God, and destroyed the authority of the ecclesiastical aristo-

cracy. The Puritan ideas were never carried out to their logical conclusion, but the tradition was established that everyone had the right to express his religious beliefs.

The groups and sects which surrounded the preaching orders were organized into an effective army by Cromwell on the basis of their religious differences. The recognition that each sect or group had a right to propagate its views was the means for establishing a kind of equality which made unity possible against the dominating idea of the established Church. This was the army which won the war and finally took over the government and even the churches.

After the war, Lilburne and others tried to do in the political area what Cromwell did with the army: to organize a political movement inclusive of all sectaries. This was the objective of the Levellers, which was a political party with religious roots. Cromwell and the Commonwealth had been supported by the sects and the Levellers. But the Baptists and Levellers fell out after the king was disposed of. Cromwell had to choose between them and he chose to suppress the Levellers. As a result, many people went back to the sects, and there was a resurgence of sectarian activity (1649).

The Quakers or Friends are a modern remnant of one of the early sectarian groups. We associate quietism with them, but this is true only after 1685. In the first ten years they were not a "quiet" group. They went about the country telling people not to pay taxes and attacking the squires and parsons. They believed in obeying God (Inner Light) and argued that they had a special authority not to pay tithes and to encourage others not to do so.

The Diggers, a group which sprang up and was quickly extinguished, were socially more radical, but a very small group with little contemporary significance. They are of interest today because of the writings of Gerald Winstanley, which are important as evidence of early sectarian democracy and equalitarianism, but the writings of Muggleton exerted much greater influence in that day.

VII

THE CONTEMPORARY SITUATION

The chief problem for democracy today is to find the middle way between the totalitarian extremes of the right and left. Until recently

Christianity has tended to place great emphasis on the bourgeois conception of liberty, resulting in an excessive individualism. Proletarian supporters of democracy have tended to emphasize the principle of equality, which was interpreted to mean complete communalism. It is the responsibility of the Christian supporters of democracy to recognize that both these principles are necessary for the development of democracy today. Failure to keep them in balance will result in its collapse.

Maritain has stated the ultimate rights of the individual from the religious standpoint. Only when men feel they must obey God rather than man is there a firm basis for resisting the tyranny of political community. The Church has final resources here which the state cannot violate with impunity, and the only state which the Church can accept is one which recognizes the sacredness of individual rights.

Yet the Church today is the greatest offender of this principle. It sets itself up as final judge of the rights of the individual. Particularly in the field of education, the Church has been guilty of wilful violation of the rights of minorities. It is this attitude which creates real problems for the recovery of democracy in most of Europe today, particularly in those countries where the anti-religious democratic tendencies have always been strong (Germany, France, and Italy). The violation of human rights (particularly minority rights) by the Lutheran and Catholic majorities in some sections feeds the hostility of the left-wing totalitarians, and weakens the position of those who sincerely seek to discover the middle way between totalitarianisms of the right and the left. On the other hand, the fanaticism of Marxists contributes to the fear of the religious supporters of democracy that no compromise is possible with the radical wing.

The question which the Church must answer is how to get justice in the social order, and this raises the problem of property. At this point the Marxists have taken the initiative from the Christians, who should have developed a pragmatic approach to the questions of when and when not to socialize property, and where it involved essential social justice they should have supported socialization. But the churches, both Protestant and Catholic, have continued to insist on traditional abstract justifications of property. Protestantism has a comparatively poorer record than Catholicism, which has traditionally qualified its acceptance of private property, whereas the Reformers

and later Protestants tended to give it a more absolute sanction. Again, the doctrinaire Marxist insistence on the socialization of all property has helped to confuse the issue. The future of democracy rests in part, therefore, upon the possibility of achieving a more realistic view of property. It is possible that, confronted by the hard realities, the Church may be brought to re-examine its tradition and thus help to reduce the tension in democracies which exists today.

VIII

ISLAM AND DEMOCRACY

Since Muhammad did not devise a system of government, forms of government are, strictly speaking, external to Islam. Therefore the religion has been able to adapt itself to many different forms of government with comparative ease. Politically, the growth of democratic tendencies in Islam centers in the decline of the Caliphate.

Following Muhammad's death there arose rivalry over the leadership, but Arnold reminds us that Umar's action in giving the handgrasp of fealty to Abu Bakr was an exemplification of the ancient Arab method of electing the chief of a tribe. There was no formal casting of ballots, but the leading members of the group filled the vacancy caused by the death of the chief by selecting someone among themselves noted for his influence and services to the common weal.[3]

Abu Bakr appointed Umar as his successor, but he, according to tradition, appointed a commission of six electors to choose the Caliph to follow him. Like the College of Cardinals they were to select one of their number as leader. Modern Muslims use the incident as a precedent for representative government. The Caliph chosen from among these six met a violent death at the hand of assassins, but these assassins recognized that the choice of a successor was the prerogative of the citizens of Medina, which had been the capital of Muhammad's rule as well as that of the Caliphs up till then. Ali, the fourth Caliph, was a son-in-law of the Prophet, and with him there was introduced the element of hereditary rule. However, his sons were unable to maintain leadership in face of the growing opposition of the leading family of the Meccan aristocrats who had once been the opponents of

3. T. W. Arnold, *The Caliphate* (Oxford, 1924), p. 20.

Muhammad. Many hold that with the advent of the house of Umayya the statement attributed to the Prophet was fulfilled: "After me there will be for thirty years a Caliphate, then it will become a tyrannical kingdom."[4] However, this dynasty retained the title Caliph, but the office was handed down from father to son or from brother to brother or some other member of the family. After less than a century which was conspicuous for the spread of Islam, this ruling house, which wore the cloak of religion lightly, was displaced by a rival Arab faction claiming a family tie with the Prophet. But the change from the Umayyads to the Abbasids brought Islamic leadership no nearer to democracy.

The Muslim theologians, philosophers, and jurists who considered theories of political sovereignty in Islam wrote long after the institution of the Caliphate had begun to decline. Under the influence of the teachings of Plato and Aristotle, they discussed the necessity for such an office and the virtues of the ruler of an ideal state. The first full exposition of the duties and qualifications of the Caliph was given by al-Mawardi who wrote in the middle of eleventh century A.D. He must be a person capable of fulfilling the administrative, judicial, and military functions, as well as being of the tribe of Quraysh, a male, free, and of full age. His duties are defined as "the defence and maintenance of religion, the decision of legal disputes, the protection of the territory of Islam, the punishment of wrong-doers, the provision of troops for guarding the frontiers, the waging of war against those who refuse to accept Islam or submit to Muslim rule, the collection of taxes, etc." The office is filled through an election by those competent to choose. However, al-Mawardi finally arrives at the position that a single person may represent the Muslim nation since many Caliphs had been chosen by their fathers, brothers, or near relatives to succeed to the office.[5]

After Turkey rejected both the Sultanate and the Caliphate, King Husayn of Mecca declared himself Caliph in 1924, but he was compelled to flee the same year before the victorious forces of Ibn Saud. There was convened in Cairo, on May 13, 1926, a congress of Muslim leaders from various nations to consider the future of the institution which had once exercised great authority in the Muslim world. Although for centuries its reality was only a shadow of what it had once

4. Cf. Ahmad b. Hanbal, *Musnad* (Cairo, 1313 AH), V, 220 f.
5. Al-Mawardi, *al-Ahkam al-Sultaniya* (Bonn, 1855), pp. 5 ff.

been, that shadow was cast over the political life of the millions of Islam.

Toynbee remarks that this congress which met in Cairo "was perhaps the first assemblage of doctors of Islamic law which had ever had a free hand to discuss the practical question of the Caliphate in academic terms."[6] These unofficial delegates recommended that a permanent committee be appointed to study the questions but did not set a date for another congress. A meeting at Mecca to discuss the problem was also fruitless. Some fondly hope that through the federation of the Arab states there may be revived this ancient institution. Others, who stress the necessity for co-operation among the Muslim nations, condemn in no uncertain terms the suggestion that there is need for such an office in the twentieth century.

In the meantime, some of the lands where the population is predominantly Muslim have adopted constitutions and elected parliamentary bodies. This democratic development, however, is more in line with the European tradition of popular government than of their Islamic heritage.

The question may be raised whether there is something in the development of Muslim jurisprudence which we may designate the will of the majority or the democratic element. Muslim writers often emphasize the theocratic side. There is perhaps little of the formal ways of democracy as we know it in legislative assemblies, in bodies representative of the people, and in constitutions ratified by those to be governed. However, there is much of unconscious democracy. What professes to be an absolute theocracy, or at least a nomocracy or rule of Law, is honey-combed with statutes resting on the opinions and customs and practices of the people. In the nineteenth century, Turkey and other Muslim countries began looking outside the world of Islam for guidance in politics, but long before there had been codes of laws in addition to the *shari'a,* of which an outstanding example is the Turkish *qanun name.*

It is in the sphere of social relationships that apologists for Islam find much of the spirit of democracy. Sometimes we in the West are startled to hear the claim made for Muhammad that he came to bring universal peace, that he was the supreme example of tolerance, and that he made no distinction between Muslims and those of other creeds. Yet it comes as a shock for Western readers to learn that Dr.

6. *Survey of International Affairs* (1925), I, 28; see also pp. 81 ff.

Ambedkar, the leader of India's some 70,000,000 untouchables, said, in talking of their future: "Why take a short step into a Christian community where social distinctions persist? Why not go all the way into a Moslem community where there is real equality for all?"[7] Was it not an Iranian who exclaimed, when shown a picture of a lynching in America, "Thank God, I live in a civilized land"?

Islam has reason to boast of its spirit of brotherhood within the fellowship of the faithful, but it has had its civil wars and, even down to this day, its record is not perfect in its attitudes to those outside, as seen in communal riots in India.

In order to appreciate the Muslim's relationship to such questions as race and nation it is necessary to recall the beginnings of Islam. Two rather conflicting ideas occur in the earlier messages spoken by Muhammad. His mission was especially to the Arabs. Allah speaks in the Qur'an saying, "We have made it an Arabic Qur'an that you might understand" (43:3). "It is a truth from thy Lord that thou mayest warn a people to whom a warner has never come before" (32:2). "Verily thou art among the prophets to warn a people whose fathers living in ignorance were not warned" (36:2-3). Yet along with these verses there are others that identify this religion for the Arabs with that primitive religion which is natural to all men, the religion proclaimed by Noah, Abraham, Moses, and Jesus (6:162, 10:73). Noah said, "I am commanded to be of the Muslims" (10:73). Jacob's dying command to his sons was to accept Islam before they die (2:127). Islam is that basic religion laid down by Allah which He hath formed people to follow by nature (30:29). There is also the tradition that all children are born in this natural religion, and only because of their parents are they made Jews and Christians.[8]

When Muhammad made the Hijra to Medina he expected the Jews and Christians there to accept him in order to be guided aright (3:19). The attacks on various groups of Jews during the next few years is proof that they did not accept him. It is recorded that the Prophet said, "I will certainly turn the Jews and Christians out of the peninsula of Arabia, until I do not leave in it any but Muslims."[9] Others

7. Quoted in the *Christian Century* (Nov. 13, 1946), p. 1368.

8. Wensinck, *A Handbook of Early Muhammadan Tradition* (Leiden, 1927), p. 43). See *fitra*.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 118.

say that Umar was responsible for saying this. However, we read of Jews being there at least thirty years after Muhammad's death.[10] If there is uncertainty about the time they were driven out, there is no doubt of the strategic policy of militant Islam in making Arabia at the outset a secure breeding-ground for the new empire's armies.

Although the Arabs formed the military caste of early Islam, lands in captured countries were not apportioned to them for building up large estates. The armies were usually stationed in camp cities. From various treaties one may learn how the land remained with its original owners, with the duty of providing through high taxation for the privilege of Muslim protection. Most of the Umayyad rulers were indifferent or even positively opposed to any great influx to Islam from the non-Muslims. They were content to have the inhabitants of conquered lands as *dhimmis,* i.e., tolerated peoples. Magians and Sabians were allowed the status of *Dhimmi,* although it was a privilege for People of the Book. And when India with its hundreds of gods was invaded, heathen temples were permitted to remain upon payment by the population of heavy taxes.

Although mass conversions did not occur until later, the fall of the Umayyad dynasty was in part due to non-Arabs. These were the people called Mawali, i.e., clients. Mostly of Persian origin, they felt aggrieved because of an inferior social position. In becoming Muslims they affiliated themselves with some Arab tribes among the conquerors. This dependence on Arab patronage definitely involved class distinction. The disadvantage of not being an Arab often led to the subterfuge of inventing a genealogy and assuming an Arab name. When the Abbasid emissaries canvassed support among the malcontents and sought their aid in revolt, they found ready listeners among the Mawali.

Slavery, one of the accepted institutions of the ancient economic order, was incorporated without question into Islam. However, slavery did not have the same connotation as in western lands, since the transition from slavery to full fledged citizenship was possible, and historically males could go from slavery to the highest positions. The Qur'an recommends that slaves receive humane treatment and reckons among praiseworthy acts the emancipation of slaves, but there is no

10. Hitti, *The Origins of the Islamic State (kitab futuh al buldan of al-Baladhuri)* (New York, 1916), p. 59.

inference that abolition of slavery was intended. It became a practice in Arabia under Islam not to enslave Muslim Arabs. Although heretics were often enslaved by their enemies down to the nineteenth century, it became illegal from earliest times to sell a free Muslim into slavery. Arabia, the fatherland of Islam, is, in the twentieth century, one of the few countries where slavery still exists.

There is one marked exception to the claim for general equality within Islam. If it is a democracy, it is a male democracy. It prides itself on the protection of womanhood. Qur'an verses and traditions are often cited to prove that it raised the status of woman in Arabia. Her right to inherit property from the days of the Prophet until now Muslims contrast with the disabilities suffered by women in European nations during many centuries of Christian civilization. However, Qur'an, tradition, and custom admonish them to obey men as their overseers, since Allah has made men superior. If they are refractory they are to be beaten (Qur'an, 4:38).

The status of the *dhimmi* as a member of a non-Muslim cult has given him the privilege of worshiping in synagogue or church under certain restrictions. The Jew and the Christian have lived for more than thirteen centuries in Muslim lands, and have been permitted to regulate their separate communities on questions of marriage and divorce and some other matters of personal status. Sometimes they have been compelled to wear distinctive garments and to be confined to certain quarters of cities. It may be counted as an undemocratic practice that Islam forced the various religious and national groups to live in separate sections of the medieval communities, but the segregation of peoples according to their origin was for their own protection, and in this sense might be construed as being more democratic, since it was on the basis of equality for all and prevented quarrels. Muslims point out that these conditions were infinitely better than those often imposed on non-Christians in European countries.

The problem of religious minorities in Arab countries and wherever Islam is the ruling power is very acute as many Muslim lands undertake to implement democratic ideals. Whether the people of the tolerated sects can be granted an equal footing before the whole law and have full participation in civil life is a real issue in the twentieth century.

DEMOCRACY AND REVELATION

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By revelation is meant, in this paper, any body of assumed truth or any allegedly authentic experience of ultimate reality which is held to come from a transcendental source, and which cannot be authenticated by rational or empirical procedures. So defined, the concept of revelation is encountered in the authoritative inspiration to which sacred writings or prophetic utterances are attributed, and in all doctrinal affirmations for which final authority is claimed. Intuition, in this context, appears as correlative to revelation, that is, as the experience of receiving it.

This definition needs some clarification. It excludes, of course, many ordinary uses of the word revelation. Also, for purposes of this discussion it is taken to exclude such a use of it as appears in the following statement of Mr. Einstein (from an unpublished paper). Speaking of "fundamental ends and valuations," he says:

> And if one asks whence derives the authority of such fundamental ends, since they cannot be stated and justified merely by reason, one can only answer: they exist in a healthy society as powerful traditions, which act upon the conduct and aspirations and judgments of the individuals; they are there, that is, as something living, without its being necessary to find justification for their existence. They come into being not through demonstration but through *revelation,* through the medium of powerful personalities. One must not attempt to justify them, but rather to sense their nature simply and clearly.

This use of the word revelation stands, perhaps, on the borderline of my definition, in that it recognizes a significant category of the nonrational, having objective validity. But revelation could never become a *problem* for Mr. Einstein. This I take to be because to his use of the word no connotation of epistemological dualism attaches. If I am not mistaken, revelation, in a religious context, always involves an essential epistemological dualism. That is to say, it postulates a self-revealing subject *other* than the object. Karl Barth's startling declaration that God is never object, but always subject is, I take it, an intentional distortion for the sake of emphasizing the reality of Christian revelation.

For us here, exploring the relation of democracy to religion, revela-

tion presents a basic problem, in that it seems to postulate a *fons auctoritatis* independent of group sanction and outside of group process. In other words, revelation raises a problem qualitatively identical with that presented by theocracy in relation to democracy. Indeed, it is only under the aspect of revelation that theocracy can be faced at all—except in apocalyptic perspective.

Is there any solution for this problem? I believe it is soluble within a framework of tenable interpretations of both democracy and revelation. I wish to point out first, however, that, if certain conceptions are insisted on in respect to these two concepts, no solution of the problem is possible.

On the one hand, if democracy be identified with a particular metaphysics, it would seem to be unrealizable in the modern world. If, for example, the meaning of democracy is found in the proposition, *vox populi, vox Dei,* taken in a definitive sense, then all who hold a theistic philosophy are excluded. If there is no voice of God that is not the voice of the people, then the voice of the people is all there is. On the other hand, if democracy be identified with a Christian or Judeo-Christian metaphysics—as a unique source of its conception of the worth of persons—then that entire portion of its following which rejects that metaphysics is repudiated. If, however, the essence of democracy as the basis for the ordering of human affairs is the affirmation that the sanction attaching to corporate commitments with respect to beliefs or policies is proportionate to the range of membership participation in their determination, then the case is different. Such a conception leaves ample room for radical metaphysical differences. On the one hand, the thoroughgoing secularist may affirm that the voice of the people *is* the only voice there is and still remain on the same *operational* plane with the theist and theocrat, who holds that the judgment of the people always stands under the judgment of God. On the other hand, when the theist maintains that belief in God is the only enduring ground for a democratic valuation of persons, he is making a *prediction* as to the viability of democracy as an operational system. Indeed, the theist and theocrat is still on the same operational plane if he affirms, as he may, that in the long run the voice of the people comes nearer to being the voice of God than the voice of any part of the people can possibly be. This is a theistic version of the democratic faith.

That all this is not merely speculative is evidenced by the fact that convinced theists and extreme secularists are daily working hand-in-hand in democratic organizations without abatement of their mutually contradictory metaphysical assumptions. I am stressing this aspect of the problem before us merely because I find a pronounced disposition on the part of many persons to rule out any solution of the problem entirely on a priori grounds. Oddly enough, in my observation, the most vocal a priorists in this connection are the scientific humanists and relativists! I shall try to present some possible views of revelation in its various aspects that are compatible with democracy as contrasted with some that, as I see them, are not.

By way of linking the present discussion to what has been said in earlier sessions, let us consider first the impact of the concept of revelation on political sovereignty. It seems to me obvious that the crux of the matter lies at the point of implementation at the human level of what is taken to be the divine will. The Old Testament story of the establishment of the monarchy is, I think, highly illuminating. Questions of historicity and chronology are quite irrelevant here, since it is the ideas that concern us. Let me read the pertinent passage:

> Then all the elders of Israel gathered themselves together, and came to Samuel unto Ramah; and they said unto him, Behold, thou art old, and thy sons walk not in thy ways: now make us a king to judge us like all the nations. But the thing displeased Samuel, when they said, Give us a king to judge us. And Samuel prayed unto Jehovah. And Jehovah said unto Samuel, Hearken unto the voice of the people in all that they say unto thee; for they have not rejected thee, but they have rejected me, that I should not be king over them. According to all the works which they have done since the day that I brought them up out of Egypt even unto this day, in that they have forsaken me, and served other gods, so do they also unto thee. Now therefore hearken unto their voice, howbeit thou shalt protest solemnly unto them, and shalt show them the manner of the king that shall reign over them (I Samuel 8:4-9).

Here is a vindication of democratic *process* within a framework of theocratic assumptions. And when the king was chosen in response to a willful demand he was none-the-less the "Lord's Anointed." The will of God might not be arbitrarily imposed. It could be validly implemented only to the extent the people were ready to implement it. The heart of the matter is, I think, the concept of the Covenant,

which was not between Jahweh and the monarch, but between Jahweh and the people.

It is also revealing that the prevailing Catholic theory of sovereignty as applied to a monarchy postulates no private channeling of the will of God to the prince; rather, sovereignty comes to the prince through the people. There is no such thing as a divine right of kings. That doctrine seems to have owed its origin to the vicissitudes of incipient nationalism rather than to a prior theological concept.

On the other hand, when political and ecclesiastical power are fused, as in the Holy Roman Empire, democracy has no direct relevance, since ecclesiastical authority is outside the democratic frame of reference. The will of God is believed to be communicated directly to pope or hierarchy who are entrusted with the governance of the Church.

I come now to a consideration of various views of the meaning of revelation with respect to their congruity with democratic assumptions. I shall limit the discussion to what is ordinarily called "special revelation." The concept of a general revelation of God in nature, although it has been the subject of sharp controversy in Protestant theology, does not create a problem in the present context. And the idea of a revelation of God in history raises no problem until it becomes special and unique—a "breaking of eternity into time." Also, I shall confine myself chiefly to Protestantism, where I am more at home. We have no time, and I claim no competence, for detailed exposition; all that will be attempted is characterization within the context of our series of discussions.

In the traditional Protestant view, revelation is conceived as the supernatural impartation of knowledge which can be had in no other way. This knowledge takes dogmatic form, in the creeds of the Church. The test of the creeds is their conformity to the Bible. Thus the principle of validation is extrinsic. The inevitable consequence of this teaching has been not one orthodoxy but many. The Protestant churches have experienced increasingly sharp inner conflict because, having invested the Scriptures with final authority and having no authoritative interpreter, intensity of religious concern has resulted in a proliferation of sectarian Christianity. Secular factors have contributed heavily to this result, as has the advance of biblical scholar-

ship. But all the while the imperative to unity has been felt. The churches have had an urge to be *the Church,* but the diversity of their interpretations of the Christian revelation has prevented the development of an ecumenical drive strong enough to overcome their divisions.

Even in single communions the lack of unity and coherence has been conspicuous. Recognition of the right of individual interpretation has fostered a latitudinarian policy, which in turn has blurred the concept of a Christian revelation. In most Protestant communions the democratic principle is theoretically relevant in that the "judicatory" bodies can change the creeds when they so desire. There is something spurious about this, however, for the strong pull of tradition operates in a conservative direction officially, while discipline with respect to belief is dissipated under the sanction of freedom of the individual conscience. Some great denominations refuse to adopt official creeds, though they harbor strong fundamentalist groups. But the general assumption remains widespread that the creeds are expressions of revealed truth. The acids of modernity have eaten into orthodox beliefs, but they have not led to any generally accepted reconstruction of the concept of revelation.

For my part, I see no way to reconcile this traditional view of revelation with democracy, since it makes the content of the revelation a body of doctrine which has been frozen at some point in history. It renders spurious all ideas of progressive revelation, even though the history of Christianity shows that the content of revelation does not escape the impact of historical vicissitudes.

I have been speaking of the traditional Protestant view of revelation. It should be recognized, however, that this can hardly be regarded as original Protestantism. For the Reformers, the heart of the Christian revelation was Jesus Christ himself. As is well known, Luther found the revelation not in the text of the Bible, but in the "Word." At least he did part of the time. Emil Brunner remarks that Luther "on the one hand expressed himself with amazing freedom about certain books in the Old Testament and in the New Testament; then suddenly, when engaged in controversy, he would appeal to the letter of Scripture as infallible because it was wholly and literally inspired by God" *(Revelation and Reason).* But was this latter the real

Luther? A recent writer says no. Professor Carlson, in *Church History*, December, 1946, writes:

> Luther's conception of revelation, it now seems clear, is not adequately stated in terms of the transfer of infallible ideas and reports into the minds of Biblical writers. It is dynamic and contemporary. God lays hold on men through His Word in a manner which is self-authenticating; it neither is capable of, nor does it require, proof. It is the very nature of the Word to rule. God—Christ—the Word—these are one and the same authority before which faith bows. No demonstrable, self-evident proof of this authority is possible; it is evident only to faith.

Calvin seems to argue both ways with reference to the authority of the Scriptures. "It must be maintained," he says, (*Institutes*, Book I, Chapter VII) "that we are not established in the belief of the doctrine till we are indubitably persuaded that God is the Author. The principal proof, therefore, of the Scriptures is everywhere derived from the character of the Divine speaker." If we read "with pure eyes and sound minds" we cannot avoid perceiving "the majesty of God, which will subdue our audacious contradictions." In a charming passage in the same chapter, he writes:

> Though, indeed, I am far from excelling in peculiar dexterity or eloquence yet, if I were to contend with the most subtle despisers of God, who are ambitious to display their wit and their skill in weakening the authority of Scripture, I trust I should be able, without difficulty, to silence their obstreperous clamor.

Yet he goes on to place ultimate reliance not on rational argument but on the witness of the spirit. He maintains that

> they who have been inwardly taught by the spirit, feel an entire acquiescence in the Scripture, and that it is self-authenticated, carrying with it its own evidence, and ought not to be made the subject of demonstration and arguments from reason; but it obtains the credit which it deserves with us by the testimony of the spirit. For though it conciliates our reverence by its internal majesty, it never seriously affects us till it is confirmed by the spirit in our hearts.

It seems clear that the Reformation contained, on the one hand, the seeds of the hard, mechanical theory of revelation which separates it from the ongoing life of the Christian community, and, on the other hand, the germ of a more creative concept which grounded revelation

in personal and social experience. The former gained ascendancy over the latter.

Albrecht Ritschl made a significant attempt to recover this latter emphasis, within the framework of his value-judgment theory. If Christ, he says,

> by what he has done and suffered for my salvation is my Lord, and if, by trusting for my salvation to the power of what He has done for me, I honour Him as my God, then that is a value-judgment of a direct kind. It is not a judgment which belongs to the sphere of disinterested scientific knowledge, like the formula of Chalcedon. When, therefore, my opponents demand in this connection a judgment of the latter sort, they reveal their own inability to distinguish scientific from religious knowledge, which means that they are not really at home in the sphere of religion. Every cognition of a religious sort is a direct judgment of value. The nature of God and the Divine we can only know in its essence by determining its value for our salvation. Let him who denies this see to it how he reconciles his position with the Larger Catechism, and with the fact that we know God only by revelation, and therefore also must understand the God-head of Christ, if it is to be understood at all, as an attribute revealed to us in His saving influence upon ourselves (*Justification and Reconciliation,* p. 398).

Among contemporary writers, Emil Brunner makes, I think, the most effective assault on the traditional view of revelation. He is rather difficult to run down because of his tireless passion for exhaustiveness, but I venture to quote a passage from his *Revelation and Reason* as a fairly explicit statement:

> The question, How do you know that what you call the Word of God is really God's Word, is not the question of doubt. Faith welcomes this question; God Himself wills that it should be asked. The Church is eager to answer it; her answer is in these terms: I know this from God Himself. This is what we mean by revelation: that God reveals Himself to me as One who speaks to me, who communicates Himself to me as living and present, whom I meet as the One who meets me. Faith is the certainty of the experience of this "conversation" or "intercourse" between ourselves and God; to try to add to this is unnecessary. To believe, without this experience of "conversation" is not faith in the Biblical sense, but in that erroneous, heteronomous, legalistic sense, where faith is supposed to arise because it has been commanded. Genuine faith does not issue from a command but from a gift, from the event of revelation. To the unreasonable suggestions of the skeptical reason, therefore, faith can only reply, To wish to argue for revelation in rational terms means that we have not begun to understand what revelation is (pp. 206 f.).

Brunner, himself, however, further on seems to do what he accuses Luther of doing, for he brings normative doctrine back into the picture. He writes:

> Christian doctrine, it is true, springs from the Word of God; but the Word of God is different from Christian doctrine. Faith cannot exist apart from sound doctrine, it is true, but it is not itself the understanding of doctrines. It is possible to hold correct views of doctrine without faith—and, indeed, in the course of the history of the Church very many people have held correct doctrinal views without possessing genuine faith. Correct doctrine is something that can be learned, and indeed anyone who has a good brain and is able to study at a good college or university can learn it easily. But faith is not something that a man can "learn"; it is the free gift of God. It is extremely bad for the Church to confuse that which is the gift of the Holy Spirit alone with that which anyone with a good brain can learn at a good college. The gulf that separates the world from the Kingdom of God, reason from the revelation of Jesus Christ, does not lie between theology and other forms of learning, but between the Word of God and theology, between the understanding through faith by means of the Spirit of God and the theological understanding of sound doctrine which any intelligent person can learn. *And yet no faith exists apart from sound doctrine, and the Word of God cannot create faith apart from correct doctrine* (p. 420; italics mine).

And ultimately Brunner seems to make the Christian revelation absolute, excluding all other revelations of God as lacking validity. It seems to me that the view he expounds establishes a basis for the relevance of democracy to a limited Christian community, that is, a community acknowledging the revelation of God in Christ and not torn by serious doctrinal differences. For his emphasis on faith as personal encounter is functionally equivalent to the democratic emphasis on individual religious freedom. So long as the focus of attention is on the free person, a free community is possible. If every member is satisfied that every other member is, so to say, negotiating with God, fellowship is natural and practical consensus is not difficult to arrive at. In other words, within the boundaries of a self-conscious religious community which makes personal encounter with the Spirit of God the all-important matter, agreement is necessary only as to the *fruits* of the Spirit, and these are, broadly speaking, among the assumptions of a democratic society.

The element of unmediatedness in such a view of revelation virtually requires a democratic process for the attainment of community. The way it works is strikingly illustrated in the Quaker meeting. I am

aware, of course, that mysticism is repugnant to Reformation theology, in its original as well as in its neo-orthodox form. Yet it seems to me that in terms of their implication for group process there is an analogy between the personal "encounter" and the "inner light."

But when revelation centers ultimately in an absolute Event (Brunner) it has only theoretical, not actual, universality, for those who are outside the community which recognizes the Event are excluded. Hence democracy has here only a limited relevance. I know of only one contemporary theologian standing squarely within the Protestant tradition who has formulated a theory of revelation which is not subject to this limitation. I refer to H. Richard Niebuhr.

Mr. Niebuhr, in his *Meaning of Revelation,* elaborates a "two-aspect theory" of history, by which he seeks to reconcile, as equally valid, the account of events given by the objective historian and the account received by the community whose history it is. All revelation, he holds, is confessional, belonging to the group to whom it has meaning. "When we speak," he says, "of revelation in the Christian church we refer to *our* history, to the history of selves or to history as it is lived and apprehended from within." He illustrates in the following passage:

> The distinction between *our* history and events in impersonal time, or between history as lived and as contemplated from the outside may be illustrated by contrasting parallel descriptions of the same social event. Lincoln's Gettysburg Address begins with history: "Fourscore and seven years ago our fathers brought forth upon this continent a new nation, conceived in liberty and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created free and equal." The same event is described in the *Cambridge Modern History* in the following fashion: "On July 4, 1776, Congress passed the resolution which made the colonies independent communities, issuing at the same time the well-known Declaration of Independence. If we regard the Declaration as the assertion of an abstract political theory, criticism and condemnation are easy. It sets out with a general proposition so vague as to be practically useless. The doctrine of the equality of men, unless it be qualified and conditioned by reference to special circumstance, is either a barren truism or a delusion" (pp. 60 f.).

Here are terms that "point to the same ultimate realities," but contextually the difference is vast. "The Congress" and "our fathers" will not equate to each other. Mr. Niebuhr adds,

> Moreover, it seems evident that the terms the external historian employs are not more truly descriptive of the things-in-themselves than those the statesman uses

and that the former's understanding of what really happened is not more accurate than the latter's. In the one case the events of history are seen from the outside, in the other from the inside (pp. 61 f.).

The difference is between history as observed and history as lived.

The implications of such a theory of revelation are, it seems to me, revolutionary, though I would not assert that the author takes the same view of them. But is there not here a conception of revelation to which the broad assumptions of democracy become wholly relevant?

One more aspect of our problem I would like to mention briefly—the relevance of democracy to the concept of prophecy. Conceived as a purely private affair, it manifestly stands outside the democratic framework. But I think such a view is unsound and historically meaningless. The key to the matter lies in the distinction, always recognized, between the true and the false prophet. The objective test of prophecy is of course, the viability of the message. If it is not validated in the ongoing stream of experience of the community, it loses its claim to authority. The intrinsic test is the degree to which the prophet authentically articulates the truest insights of the community to which he belongs. There is likely to be a lag between the utterance and the recognition of its authentic quality. The prophet himself may be stoned. But this is because his insight has a time dimension. I am not asserting that mere acceptance by the community is an ontological proof of truth. Rather, I am suggesting that in an ethical religion prophecy can have no meaning at all if it cannot be validated in the life of the community. Prophecy is concerned as much with the nature of man and of history as it is with the will of God. This is why, I think, that Karl Barth, under the rude impact of historical realities, had to abandon his doctrine of the non-relevance to historic process of divine revelation. True prophecy is rooted in the religious life of the community and therefore has a criterion of ethical validity. The prophet's word has to be validated in the present or future insights of his fellows. This is not a logical necessity, to be sure. Theoretically, the word of God may be conceived as having only transcendental reference, but this, I think, does immeasurable violence to faith as expressed in Judeo-Christian terms.

Now, a concluding word. What I have been saying about revelation may seem to be so far from prevailing conceptions as to have little practical significance. Yet I am not sure that it should seem so. In a

conversation with one of the most eminent of Catholic lay philosophers, I asked why it was that with an unquestioned dogma of papal infallibility the popes so seldom availed themselves of it. He replied, "I think the Church has had all the infallibility it has been worthy of. If the Church had been better, it would have had more. The pope himself can't get away from the people." When I repeated that remark to an eminent Jesuit scholar, he lifted his eyebrows! It may not be sound doctrine but I can't forget it. Perhaps it has prophetic import.

THE IDEA OF DEMOCRACY IN CONTEMPORARY CATHOLICISM

WILLIAM J. FITZGERALD

IN THIS PAPER I am chiefly concerned with an analysis of the idea of democracy as found in recent papal pronouncements. There are many reasons why this subject merits some study at the present time. It is generally acknowledged that the present Pope, Pius XII (Eugenio Pacelli) is an able statesman who, from many years of practical experience, has a deep understanding of world affairs and the perplexing problems that presently beset the human family. This practical knowledge is quite evident in his discussion of democracy, which he treats from a political and juridical viewpoint rather than the ethical and social, as had his predecessors, Leo XIII (1878-1903) and Pius XI (1922-1939). Pius XII explicitly states that democracy is not only a legitimate but a desirable form of government. In his Christmas Message of 1944, he says, "Considering the extent and nature of the sacrifices demanded of all citizens, especially in our day when the activity of the State is so vast and decisive, the democratic form of government appears to many a postulate of nature imposed by reason itself." Leo XIII and Pius XI merely tolerated Democracy as a legitimate form of government, while the popes from the time of Pius VII (1800-1823) to Gregory XVI (1831-1846), having accepted the ultra conservative and reactionary European policy of Metternich and the Congress of Vienna, were openly hostile to democracy. To most Catholics in Continental Europe and in Latin America, the terms democracy and liberalism became wellnigh synonymous with anticlericalism. Even the canonists and theologians failed to distinguish between Anglo-American evolutionary liberalism, with its Christian foundation and its Christian principles,[1] and Continental revolutionary liberalism, with its heathen heritage of Roman law and Jacobinism. Since the authors studied in Catholic seminaries are, for the most part, Continental European canonists and theologians, this hostility to all forms of liberalism became widespread

1. See Richard O'Sullivan, K. C., *Christian Philosophy in the Common Law* (Oxford, 1947); Dom Aelred Graham, "Catholic Theology and English Culture" in *Clergy Review* (1942) pp. 12-22; J. J. Saunders, "Catholic Origins of English Tradition" in *Dublin Review* (1942) pp. 115 ff.; John U. Nef, *United States and Civilization* (Chicago, 1942) pp. 68 ff.

among Catholics and was nurtured by bitter and prolonged political struggles which were still more complicated by nationalist and religious elements in the conflict between England and Ireland. Professor William A. Orton writes:

> Catholic priests and teachers in America, reflecting the strongly Latin background of their constituency, tend to associate liberalism with anti-clericalism, agnosticism, the Grand Orient and aggressive atheism. It was not an association which bothered Acton and his fellow Catholics in England . . . but it is a very natural association to those whose conception of liberalism comes almost entirely from non-British sources. The pity is that it encourages American radicals to represent the Church as the enemy of all liberalism; to ignore or deny those profoundly liberal elements which, stemming from Aristotle, lie at the heart of Catholic faith and action. Acton's insistence on liberty as the highest political end protected the refusal all Christians must make to Caesar—any kind of Caesar—the things that are God's.[2]

On this point Professor E. C. Butler writes:

> Instead of harking back wistfully to a past gone beyond possibility of restoration or looking forward to a Utopia impractical of realization, the Catholic Church has, here and now, to carry on in the modern world her great work of saving the souls of modern men with modern mentality in modern conditions. It seems a pity that Catholic writers, theologians, and others, do not follow the example of the Popes in refraining from theorizings that offend and antagonize the modern mind on points that are not articles of Catholic Faith or essential Catholic teachings: thus raising obstacles to the work of the Church for promoting a return to religion amid the ideas and social conditions and civilization of today. The Church has to work *for* the modern world *in* the modern world and the fewer the causes of friction, of offence, of misunderstanding, of antagonism, the better will she be able to carry out her mission of saving the world in the modern world. There is much to be said for reducing to a minimum, as far as is allowed by the law of God and the divine institution of the Church, the things that give rise to opposition and irritation and distrust in the minds of modern men, such as claims and privileges that had their use in former ages but can no longer be effectively asserted or have lost their value.[3]

While Catholics in general tended to distrust liberal and democratic movements, many distinguished and able liberal Catholics of various nationalities, realizing the urgent necessity to dispel the misunder-

2. William A. Orton, *The Challenge of Christian Liberalism* (Chicago, 1946), p. 7. See also his work, *Liberal Tradition,* (Yale, 1945).

3. E. E. Butler, "The Catholic Church and Modern Civilization" in *European Civilization,* Eyre, ed. (Oxford, 1937) Vol. 6., p. 1507.

standing between Christianity and modern society, became leaders of Christian democratic movements which continued to grow until the rise of totalitarianism.[4] Because they believed in the democratic way of life and had the courage of their convictions, many of these Catholic scholars, like those of other faiths, have suffered much in concentration camps or in exile while the totalitarian powers controlled Europe.

In studying the Catholic contributions to democratic principles, it is well to keep in mind that the Church has lived, sometimes in a favored position and sometimes in bitter conflict, under different political regimes. While she insists on the protection of fundamental human rights, she is not committed to any particular form of civil government. In fact, there is no isolated Catholic theory of the State. However, there is a definite Catholic theory of society which includes the individual, the family, the church and the state. This Catholic conception of society does not demand the unification of church and state, since it recognizes both as perfect and sovereign in themselves, having their own proper ends and the necessary means to attain their respective ends; man's temporal welfare on the part of the state and man's eternal welfare on the part of the church.[5] Since both are concerned with the same subject, man,[6] a rational, responsible, individual, created person, with a transcendent spiritual nature whose ultimate destiny is the Creator, yet so naturally social and political that he could not live much less develop outside of society, this theory of society does ask that both co-operate in protecting and guiding the wayfarer to his eternal home. Intelligent Catholics recognize and gratefully acknowledge that their fundamental rights are far better pro-

4. See Luigi Sturzo, *Nationalism and Internationalism* (New York, 1946) pp. 92-124, and his essay "Philosophic Background of Christian Democracy" in *Review of Politics,* IX (1947) 1-15.; Also, C. Constantin, "Libéralisme Catholique" in *Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique,* IX, 506-629; T. P. Moon, *Labor Problem and Social Catholic Movement in France,* (New York, 1921).

5. See J. P. Kelly, "Law of the Catholic Church" in *Jurist,* III (1943) 539-44; C. Lattery, ed. *Church and State* (London, 1936); Luigi Sturzo, *Church and State* (London, 1939).

6. See H. A. Rommen, "The Idea of Man" pp. 57-90, of his work, *The State in Catholic Thought* (St. Louis, 1945); also Gerald Vann, *Morals Makyth Man,* (London, 1937); and in *Dictionnaire Théologie Catholique*: "Création," III, 2034-2201; "Innocence" Etat d', VII, 1939-1940; "Incarnation," VII, 1446-1539; "Adoption Surnaturelle," I, 426-437; "Grâce," VI, 1554-1687.

tected under the American form of government than under other forms where church and state are united. History, both contemporary and past, furnishes adequate proof.

In his allocution reviewing the state of the world delivered on June 2, 1947, Pius XII spoke as follows:

> In our Christmas message of 1944, addressing a world full of enthusiasm for democracy and eager to be its champion and proponent we expounded the main moral requirements for a true and healthy democracy. Today not a few fear that the hope placed in that order has diminished, owing to the striking contrast between democracy in words and in concrete reality. If at this moment we raise our voice, it is not to discourage the many men of good will who have already set to work nor to belittle what has already been attained, but it is only through a desire to contribute, as far as in us lies, to an improvement of present conditions. It is not yet too late for the peoples of the earth to bring about, in a united and loyal effort, these conditions so indispensable for security, for universal prosperity or at least for a tolerable modus vivendi and for a helpful organization of liberty.[7]

In his Christmas message of 1944, Pius did, indeed, champion democracy and the "common man," to the dismay and embarrassment of many Catholics who had been vociferously proclaiming that a Catholic social order was essentially aristocratic, and that liberal European Catholics who favored democracy were advocating the revival of the French Revolution with its anti-Christian heritage of Roman law and Jacobinism and, furthermore, were importing into cultured Europe vulgar American slogans like "government of the people, by the people, and for the people."[8]

Indeed, it would seem that the liberal Catholics were much more orthodox than the paternal autocrats who had ignored the Catholic idea of man as an individual, rational, responsible person with a wounded but not vitiated fallen nature. It is a matter of historic fact that the social ideas of Lamennais are now accepted as orthodox Catholic teaching.[9]

"To the contemporary world which is seeking better and more perfect forms of democracy the Church," states Pius XII, "has the mission to announce the highest and most needed message—the dignity of man, adoptive son of God." He recognizes the conviction that

7. *New York Times,* June 3, 1947.
8. See John LaFarge, "The Pope and Democracy" in *Thought,* XX (1945) pp. 10-11.
9. See Waldemar Gurian, "Lamennais," in *Review of Politics,* IX (1947) 205-29.

in the blazing heat of the furnace that imprisons them, the people have awakened as it were from a deep stupor. They have taken a new attitude toward the State and toward those who govern—they ask questions, they criticize and they distrust. Taught by bitter experience they are more aggressive in opposing the concentration of power in dictatorships that cannot be censured, and in calling for a system of government more in conformity with the dignity and liberty of citizens.

The emphasis of Pius XII on the dignity of the "common man" in his personal character and in his social nature coincides with the sound idea of man as found in the Common Law and Constitutional systems of the United States, England, Ireland, and the British Commonwealth of Nations—the *liber et legalis homo* (the free and law-abiding man)—the ideal citizen. "If I were looking for a far juster picture of him [the common man] than I find in many political theorists," writes the distinguished scholar, Carleton Kemp Allen, of Oxford, "I should turn to the Average Reasonable Man of English Law."[10] The "common man," then, has dignity, inviolable rights, and concurrent duties, because he is a rational person with a spark of divinity and an eternal destiny. Hence, this responsible, mature microcosm, instead of being merely the receptive or passive agent in the social order, is in fact, and of right ought to be the subject, foundation, and end of the social order.

The freedom and dignity of the citizen, according to Pius XII, require, in a healthy and genuine democratic social order, that the common man should be entitled to express his opinion of the duties and sacrifices imposed on him and not forced to obey without first being heard. It is clear that Pius XII is here stating the democratic theory in juridical terms, and that he goes far beyond the social and ethical idea of democracy as found in Leo XIII and Pius XI. Again he states that the development of democracy demands that the common man be put in a progressively better position to hold his own personal opinion, to express it and to act on his judgment in a manner consonant with the public welfare. For the State is, and in practice, ought to be "the organic and organizing unity of a real people." Then follows a clear and sharp distinction between a people which lives and

10. *Democracy and the Individual,* (Oxford, 1943) p. 16; see also C. H. McIlwain, "The English Common Law, Barrier Against Absolutism," *American Historical Review* (1943) pp. 23-31.; N. Neilson, "Early Pattern of the Common Law," A. H. R. (1944) pp. 199-212.

moves by virtue of its own internal life and an inert mass which gets its motive force from the outside.

This is one of the most important points in the whole message, for the Communistic conception of democracy is based on the inert masses and economic equality, while Pius' idea of the people coincides with the British and American conception which actually is the foundation of our parliamentary representative government—the idea of the people as a corporate moral personality. This means a civilized people with its traditional law and juridical organization, with its government based on the idea of man as an individual, rational, responsible person capable of working out intelligent methods of procedure and ruling himself. The inert and uncritical masses are an easy prey for any rabble rouser who may wish to exploit them and seize power unlawfully; such an inert mass is "the mortal enemy of true democracy and its ideals of liberty and equality," says Pius. "In a people worthy of the name the individual citizen recognizes within him the consciousness of his personality, of his rights and his duties, of his own freedom as well as respect for the rights, the liberty and the dignity of others."

Again, Pius XII claims that the democratic State, whether republican or monarchial in form, must have real and effective authority to rule its citizens. The person, the government, and the state with their respective rights are so closely united that they stand or fall together:

> A genuine and sound democracy based on the immutable principles of the natural law and revealed truth will make a determined stand against those tendencies which attributes to the State and its legislation an unlimited power not subject to law and makes democracy in spite of some deceptive appearances into a form of Totalitarianism.

Pius XII here refers to the natural law, and it is important to keep in mind that the Catholic idea of the natural law[11] is teleological in its conception of nature, divine in its source, and normative in its relation to human conduct. It is based on the ideas of order and purpose in the universe. It presupposes the aid of God's grace to enable man, a creature with a spark of the divine, to attain his eternal destiny. Its

11. See L. P. Taparelli, *Saggio Teoretico di Dritto Naturale*, 4th ed. (Rome, 1928); Jacques Leclercq *Leçons de droit naturel* (Namur, 1933-37); A. Beck, "The Thomist Approach to Natural Law," in *Clergy Review* (1947) pp. 73-91; Heinrich Rommen, *The Natural Law* (St. Louis, 1947).

conception and action remain within the framework of the natural order which grace does not destroy but elevates, and its existence is known through reason. It is the foundation of inviolable human rights, since without an objective standard of morality such terms as rights, justice, equity, and good government are arbitrary and vary in meaning and value. This Christian idea of man and human society accepts as fact that this world has a creator and that the order of creation supposes initial wisdom.

The development of democracy and an international social order based on democratic principles requires, states Pius XII, a high degree of moral and mental maturity of the individual citizens in their effort to establish what is called the acme of social development, the unity of the family of nations or peoples. Furthermore, he states that it is the duty of all men to ban all wars of aggression as a legitimate solution of international disputes and as a means towards realizing national aspirations. This grave duty can tolerate neither delay, hesitation, nor subterfuge.

"The idea of war as a just and suitable means of solving international conflicts is outmoded." Aggressors who commit crimes against humanity may and must be punished in their individual capacity, but to punish whole peoples would be "a violation of the code which guides every human trial." In proportion as people collaborate in the work of reconstruction, states Pius, they should be given the opportunity in the course of time to be associated with the great international community of peoples with the same rights as other States. Justice is the basis of right, because it demands that we seek things only for their objective value. Its criterion is objective, being a measure always equal in itself and equal for all. Justice is universal in its application, so that whatever is just for one people cannot but be just for another. The human family is a moral personality, and the moral value of our own personality demands that we respect the dignity, liberty, equality, and fraternity of other persons. It is of prime importance, states Pius XII, to erect some juridical institution which shall guarantee the loyal and faithful fulfillment of international agreements, and which will, where the principles of justice and equity require, revise and correct them. Democracy is a reign of law, but law in itself is not sufficient to guarantee a sound democratic social order. Juridical solidarity, says Pius, must be based on justice, liberty,

equality and the universal brotherhood of man. Peace is the result of justice and charity. Charity is an essential complement of justice for it eliminates hostile motives among peoples. No doctrine has been better able to reconcile the inherent requirements of liberty and equality than the Christian idea of the universal brotherhood of man under the fatherhood of God.

In his address to the members of the Ecclesiastical Court of the Rota on October 2, 1945 and again on October 6, 1946, Pius XII discusses the fundamental distinction in origin and nature of authority in church and state, two perfect societies of which authority is an essential part and necessary function.

It is unquestionable, he says, that one of the vital requirements of any community of human beings in church as well as in state is the permanent establishment of unity in the variety of its members. Totalitarianism, according to Pius XII, can never meet that requirement, since it grants to the civil power unlimited and unwarranted scope, and determines both in regard to form and content, every sphere of activity. It confines every legitimate activity of private individual life, as well as professional and local, within a mechanical unity or collectivity in terms of nation, race, or class. This is incompatible, he insists, with the nature of man as well as the social authority of the Church. Equally unsatisfactory in regard to the same vital requirement is the authoritarian idea of civil power, for it prevents the citizens from any effective share or influence in the government. It consequently divides the nation mechanically into ruled and rulers and governs by force or racial considerations. It is obvious, continues Pius, that this idea is a distortion of the true nature of the power of the state whose real purpose is the formation of the state into a genuine community closely united in the pursuit of happiness or common good. But, in such a social order, the idea of the common good is unstable and easily becomes a cloak for the unilateral action of the ruling party. It also destroys juridical independence.

In the Church, continues Pius, each physical and moral person is recognized as possessing fundamental rights, and no such false dynamism can possibly submerge or destroy them. With this authoritarianism the "nature of ecclesiastical authority and the hierarchical constitution of the Church has nothing in common."

Where there is a true democracy both in theory and practice the ful-

fillment of those vital requirements for a healthy society will be found there, and admittedly they may be found also in other legitimate forms of good government. But when a people fail to maintain "Christian principles of civil life, democracy easily becomes corrupt and is apt eventually to degenerate into totalitarianism or authoritarianism. Great Christian thinkers of all ages have defended the thesis that the people is the original subject of civil authority which comes ultimately from God." The origin of the Church, continues Pius, unlike that of the state is not to be found in the natural law, for the Church owes her origin to

> a positive act of God which, indeed, is in perfect accord with the social nature of man but which completely transcends it. Therefore, the authority of the Church derives from the free act by which Christ founded the Church. This however is not to deny that the Church having been constituted by the Redeemer as a perfect society, not a few of her essential properties present a similarity with the structure of civil society.

The question of the greatness or extent of the power of the Church, he continues, is quite different from that of the parallel question regarding the power of the state. For the Church the important factor is the "express will of Christ, who in His wisdom and goodness might have chosen to grant her greater or less power always safeguarding the minimum which is necessarily required by the Church's nature and end." The power of the Church extends to the whole man in all that concerns the attainment of his supernatural end.

> Man is subject to the law of Christ and of this law the Church has been constituted by her divine founder as the guardian and executor in the external forum as well as the internal forum of conscience. Her power then is complete and perfect and yet it has nothing in common with totalitarianism that refuses to admit or allow an honest appeal to the clear and inviolable dictates of a man's conscience, a totalitarianism which does violence to those laws of individual and social life which are written in the hearts of men (Rom. 2:15). The object of the Church with her power is not to enslave the human person but to safeguard his freedom and development, redeeming it from those infirmities and errors, from those aberrations of mind and heart which always end in slavery.

It is quite evident that in the two perfect societies, church and state, concern for the common good requires that provision be made for the recognition, guarantee, protection, and restriction in court of the rights of their members. These personal and property rights are, more-

over, somewhat the same in church and state, for the Catholic Church being a visible society, her life, like the life of man, is conditioned by the physical elements of space and time. On the other hand, there are rights so peculiar and proper to ecclesiastical jurisdiction by their very nature that they cannot be the object of the State juridical control, for example, Faith, the foundation of supernatural life.

Concerning tolerance and freedom of conscience, Pius XII states:

> though the modern conscience may feel that in the past the punishment of offenses injurious to Faith sometimes went beyond the limits of justice, present day society is very indifferent and insensitive to any such offenses. The ever increasing contacts and indiscriminate mingling of various religious denominations within the same national groups require that the civil law apply the principle of tolerance and freedom of conscience. In such circumstances let us add that Catholics are in duty bound to practice political, civil and social tolerance in regard to the faithful of other denominations.

Pius then refers to Canon 1351 of the Code of Canon Law[12] and states that the Church herself has given legal sanction to the maxim—no one may be compelled to embrace the Catholic faith against his will *(ad amplexandam fidem catholicam nemo invitus cogatur).* The moral value of our own personality demands that we respect the dignity and the rights, including religious liberty, of other persons. It is sound Catholic doctrine that one is bound to follow the dictates of his conscience.

Professor W. E. Garrison, of the Theological Faculty of the University of Chicago, must be given credit for being the first scholar to state that religious liberty is simply civil liberty exercised in the field of religion, and that it is inadequately based and precariously held in any regime which does not guarantee the full range of civil liberties to every individual.[13] Father J. Courtney Murray, a very able theologian, writing on this subject of religious freedom[14] seems to be of the same opinion, but does not explicitly say so. It is undeniable that much misunderstanding would be avoided by the general adoption of this principle. Against the totalitarian tyranny of Nazi Germany, Pius XI wrote in *Mit Brennender Sorge:*[15] "The believer has the inalienable

12. *Codex Juris Canonici,* ed. by Card. Gasparri (Rome, 1918).

13. See his able analysis in *Church History* (1946) 195-219, on "Democratic Rights in the Roman Catholic Tradition."

14. See his essay in *Theological Studies* (1945) pp. 228-86.

15. *Acta Apostolicae Sedis* (1937), p. 160.

right to profess his faith and to practice it in ways appropriate to it. Laws which suppress or make difficult the profession and practice of this faith stand in contradiction with the natural law." The appeal is to the natural law, and on this point Father Murray writes: "I do not think that the term 'der gläubige Mensch' can be taken to mean solely *fidelis* in the theological sense of the term."[16] His meaning here is obvious—simply that the term "faithful" as used by Pius XI seems not to be restricted to "Catholic faithful" as *fidelis* is in Canon Law. Professor Christopher Dawson, in his work, *Judgment of the Nations* (pp. 165 ff.) seems to hold the same opinion. However, some Catholic theologians hold that it is restricted to canonical faithful.

It has been well said that personality implies generosity of spirit, mutual understanding, and mutual exchange of the benefits of intelligence and love or charity. The radical independence and individualism of personality does not signify isolation, but calls for more united effort. The human person is not only social and political by nature, but man by nature is the friend of his fellow man, not his enemy. Law and government are a necessary good, since men cannot live and develop as human beings except in a well-ordered society which is itself a means for their development as persons. Democratic free society rests on the assumption that men, in spite of their weaknesses and ignorance, are more inclined towards good than evil, towards knowledge and truth than towards ignorance. Democracy demands intellectual leadership directed towards the highest human ideals and, paradoxical though it may seem, the preservation of democracy depends upon an aristocracy of the mind imbued with enduring principles. Democracy, as Maritain states, has its roots in Christianity. Perhaps Christianity did not actually discover it, but it certainly has nurtured it. Christianity gave to the secular world a higher concept of morality[17]—man's inherent dignity as a creature of God, possessed in his immortal soul of the spark of divinity itself, alone of all creation responsibile for his acts and, under God, master of his own destiny. In the final analysis, every political and social order is the embodiment of its idea of man. According to Pius XII's idea of man democratic free society is, of all forms of government the world has ever known, the best and most

16. *Op. cit.*, p. 283, n. 24.

17. See C. N. Cochrane, *Christianity and Classical Culture* (Oxford, 1940); J. Westbury-Jones, *Roman and Christian Imperialism* (London, 1939).

desirable, because, "considering the extent and nature of the sacrifices demanded of all citizens, the democratic form of government appears to many a postulate of nature imposed by reason itself." On principles derived from their faith and their philosophy Catholics should promote, maintain, and loyally defend the democratic way of life. According to Pius XII, democratic free society would be *personalistic,* respecting the personal dignity of its members; *communitarian,* emphasizing the common good; *pluralistic* and *constitutional,* acknowledging the existence and respecting the rights of individuals, families, and minority groups; and finally *theistic,* as essential to the temporal mission of civilization.

In this brief introductory study I have merely tried to interpret as accurately as possibly Pius XII's idea of democracy as found in recent papal documents. I believe that this subject merits a much more extensive treatment which would include not only the works of Pius XII but also the works of representative Catholic scholars. The fundamental human rights of which Pius speaks are protected by constitutional guarantees in a few Catholic countries, especially Belgium, Ireland, and Brazil. I include the relevant extracts from these constitutions. In spite of some recent deviation from this policy, notably in the new Italian constitution, it is to be hoped that many other Catholic countries will recognize and constitutionally protect fundamental human rights including religious freedom.

PERSONAL RIGHTS AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN THE CONSTITUTION OF IRELAND OR EIRE

(JULY 1937)

ARTICLE 5

Ireland is a sovereign, independent, democratic state.

ARTICLE 6

All powers of government, legislative, executive and judicial, derive, under God, from the people, whose right it is to designate the rulers of the State and, in final appeal, to decide all questions of national policy, according to the requirements of the common good.

These powers of government are exercisable only by or on the authority of the organs of State established by this Constitution.

ARTICLE 40

All citizens shall, as human persons, be held equal before the law.

This shall not be held to mean that the State shall not in its enactments

have due regard to differences of capacity, physical and moral, and of social function.

The State guarantees in its laws to respect, and, as far as practicable, by its laws to defend and vindicate the personal rights of the citizen.

The State shall, in particular, by its laws protect as best it may from unjust attack and, in the case of injustice done, vindicate the life, person, good name, and property rights of every citizen.

No citizen shall be deprived of his personal liberty save in accordance with law.

The dwelling of every citizen is inviolable and shall not be forcibly entered save in accordance with law.

The State guarantees liberty for the exercise of the following rights, subject to public order and morality:—

The right of the citizens to express freely their convictions and opinions.

The right of the citizens to assemble peaceably and without arms.

ARTICLE 41

The State recognises the Family as the natural primary and fundamental unit group of Society, and as a moral institution possessing inalienable and imprescriptible rights, antecedent and superior to all positive law.

The State, therefore, guarantees to protect the Family in its constitution and authority, as the necessary basis of social order and as indispensable to the welfare of the Nation and the State.

ARTICLE 44

The State acknowledges that the homage of public worship is due to Almighty God. It shall hold His Name in reverence, and shall respect and honour religion.

The State recognises the special position of the Holy Catholic Apostolic and Roman Church as the guardian of the Faith professed by the great majority of the citizens.

The State also recognises the Church of Ireland the Presbyterian Church in Ireland, the Methodist Church in Ireland, the Religious Society of Friends in Ireland, as well as the Jewish Congregations and the other religious denominations existing in Ireland at the date of the coming into operation of this Constitution.

Freedom of conscience and the free profession and practice of religion are, subject to public order and morality, guaranteed to every citizen.

RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN THE CONSTITUTION OF BELGIUM (MAY 1896)

ARTICLE 14

Religious liberty and the freedom of public worship are guaranteed, unless crimes are committed in the use of these liberties.

ARTICLE 15

No one shall be compelled to join in any manner whatever in the forms and ceremonies of any religion, nor to observe its days of rest.

ARTICLE 16

The State shall not interfere either in the appointment or in the installation of the ministers of any religion whatever, nor shall it forbid them to correspond with their superiors or publish their proceedings, subject to the ordinary responsibility of the press and of publication. . . .

RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN THE CONSTITUTION OF BRAZIL (SEPTEMBER 1946)

ARTICLE 141

The liberty of conscience and creed is inviolable, and the free exercise of religious sects is assured, except that they shall not be contrary to public order or good morals. Religious associations shall acquire juridical personalty in the form of the civil law.

No one shall be deprived of any of his rights by reason of his religious, philosophic or political conviction, unless he shall invoke it in order to exempt himself from any obligation, duty, or service required by the law of Brazilians in general, or shall refuse those which the same law may establish as substitutes for those duties in order to meet an excuse of conscience.

ARTICLE 168

Religious instruction shall be part of the teaching schedule of official schools, and shall be administered in accordance with the religious confession of the pupil, manifested by him, if he is capable or by his legal representative or person responsible for him.

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MODERN PROTESTANTISM AND DEMOCRACY

JOHN C. BENNETT

THIS PAPER IS BASED UPON THE ASSUMPTION that it is now misleading to consider only the classical types of the Christian religion, Catholic or Protestant, and ask how far these types are favorable or unfavorable to democracy. There has been, in the recent past, a development of thought and life within those Churches that belong to the so-called ecumenical[1] movement which has brought most of them into a much closer relation to the democratic aspirations of men than has been the case with any of the great types of Christianity in their classical periods, except for some forms of sectarianism. What I shall say here will apply most fully to Protestantism, though in some nations there are democratic tendencies in Catholicism, and they apply also to Anglo-Catholicism.

I shall begin with two quotations from widely different sources:

> These (totalitarian forces) hate democracy and Christianity as two phases of the same civilization. They oppose democracy because it is Christian. They oppose Christianity because it preaches democracy (Madison Square Garden speech in 1940 campaign).

> When I consider the deepest and most central content of the New Testament exhortation, I should say that we are justified, from the point of view of exegesis, in regarding the "democratic conception of the State" as a justifiable expansion of the thought of the New Testament (*Church and State,* p. 80).

The authors of those two statements are Franklin D. Roosevelt and Karl Barth. I quote both of them because they are so different. Roosevelt was no theologian, but he said what he assumed to be perfectly obvious, and that suggests something about the forms of Christianity in the society that he knew. Barth, after giving the impression for years that one social system is as good as another because all are so sinful, finds himself forced by events to find exegetical defense of democracy in the New Testament.

1. The word "ecumenical," as I shall use it, refers to a particular co-operative movement among the Protestant and Eastern Orthodox Churches which has its chief institutional expression in the World Council of Churches.

There is today a general impression that Christianity and democracy are closely akin, but historically most Christian Churches have found some form of constitutional aristocracy more to their liking. Christianity and tyranny have usually proved incompatible except in the Byzantine world, but rule by the best under law has often been preferred. Today the climate has changed in a pervasive way. I shall suggest some of the reasons for this change and indicate more precisely the direction that it is taking.

THE RELEASING OF DEMOCRATIC ELEMENTS IN CHRISTIANITY

On the surface there are two elements in the Christian religion that are favorable to democracy. One is the belief in the dignity of all men as children of God, and the other is the commandment of universal love. Until the recent past, neither of these elements in Christianity actually provided much support for democracy, because they were subordinated to two other emphases: (1) *stress upon the hierarchical structure of society as given by divine providence;* and (2) *a paternalistic interpretation of Christian love.* Both of these emphases have recently been swept away throughout most of Protestantism, and so the democratic implications of basic Christian faith and ethics can now be seen more clearly. I shall comment on both of these developments.

So long as Christians lived in a stable world in which class distinctions and the majesty of kings could impress even those who lived at the bottom of the social ladder as having a divine sanction, the conservative interpretation of divine providence generally had priority over the revolutionary elements in Christian ethics. One sees this respect for the social hierarchy nearly everywhere. The defenses of slavery in the South and the fulminations of the Federalist clergy in the North against the Jeffersonian "rabble" may remind us that even America did not escape from this religious conservatism. The American experiment did, however, prove that a great nation could be formed by the lower classes of the old world. Lutheranism encouraged this anti-democratic conservatism. Anglicanism taught the lower classes to keep in their stations, until after the second half of the last century. Calvinism did make room for revolutions, but the result was often to establish a new social hierarchy. There are remnants of this

today in the Netherlands among the conservative Calvinists, who oppose Labor at home and who still believe that Dutch rule over the Indies has a special divine sanction.

In the past half century there has been a radical change, more general in Anglicanism and Calvinism than in Lutheranism, to be sure, and almost universal in the American Churches. The Catholic Church since Leo XIII has been affected by the same influences, but the results are too complicated for me to discuss in this paper. This change has undermined any illusions that Christians may have had in the past about the providential nature of class distinctions, of white supremacy, of the rule of the imperialist powers over subject peoples. The missionary movement, which has often been associated in the minds of its critics with the political and economic penetration of Asia and Africa by the great western powers, has in recent decades come to represent the aspirations of the peoples of those continents to the Christians of Europe and America.

This profound change was probably due in the main to the new articulateness and to the new social power of oppressed and neglected classes and races. But it should be remembered that the privileged classes and races armed these other groups against themselves by extending education and the franchise, and that religious idealism had a considerable part in those developments. Also, the Marxist teaching that fortified these rising groups in many places had Hebrew-Christian origins. The events that have forced these changes of mind upon the churches were in part the unintended result of influences that can be traced to the Hebrew-Christian tradition, though it is doubtful if the Churches would have been won to a more democratic interpretation of the providence of God if these events had not hit them hard as external forces. But these forces did have as allies in the Churches those Christians who learned from the Old Testament prophets, who responded once again to the radicalism implicit in the Gospel, who had the vision to see through the rationalizations and pretensions of the privileged classes and races. There has been a world-wide trend in the Churches that represents this radical criticism of the status quo in place of the conservative use of the idea of divine providence as providing a religious sanction for the status quo. This means that the very real strain of egalitarianism in Christianity has been released from theological inhibitions and has become effective in society.

If one considers the most influential thinkers in contemporary Protestantism, one finds this to be true. I refer to such men as Archbishop William Temple, Karl Barth, Emil Brunner (with perhaps a slight difference of emphasis), Reinhold Niebuhr, Nicolas Berdyaev, the Russian Orthodox thinker, and such Roman Catholics as Maritain belong in that company. If one takes the ecumenical pronouncements of recent years, one sees the same tendency. The Oxford Conference report of 1937 is perhaps still the most significant ecumenical document, and it is shot through with this democratic spirit. One finds this tendency in the political activities of Christian leaders in many countries—Britain, France, Holland, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden especially. The German situation is still too confused to make much of the fact that Christians are active in political parties that are leftist compared with American parties. They are controlled in most cases by opposition to Communism.

I need not labor so long the second change that I have mentioned: the debunking of the paternalistic interpretation of Christian love. So long as it was possible for Christians to satisfy themselves that it was for the good of the lower classes or for the colored races that they remain in a superior status exercising power over these less privileged people, love was not necessarily on the side of the democratic aspirations of men. But today such paternalism cannot be defended with moral confidence. The Churches, in this case both Catholic and Protestant, in both Europe and America, have come around to accept the moral right of labor to organize. In America this has been the acid test of whether one was willing to abandon paternalistic interpretations of Christian love.

I shall quote a passage from the Oxford Conference report that has always seemed to me to mark an epoch in Christian thinking about the claims of paternalistic love and a democratic conception of justice. The passage begins by saying that modern technology has made poverty unnecessary and goes on to say:

> The possibility of economic "plenty" has this moral importance, that to an increasing extent it makes the persistence of poverty a matter for which men are morally responsible. This possibility marks off our time from the period of the New Testament and from other periods in which Christian thinking about economic life has been formulated. In the light of it the direction of Christian effort in relation to the economic order should hence-

forth be turned from charitable paternalism to the realization of more equal justice in the distribution of wealth (p. 87).

In other words, it is now anachronistic to quote "the poor ye have always with you" to make yourself complacent about other peoples' poverty.

So far I have said nothing about political democracy as such. I have tried to show that two major anti-democratic factors have been largely outgrown by the modern Church and that there is now free scope for the egalitarian tendency in Christian faith and ethics which is favorable to democracy.

CHRISTIANITY AND POLITICAL DEMOCRACY

In considering the relationship between Christianity and political democracy it is necessary to begin with two warnings. The first is that no democratic society, or any other kind of society, can be regarded as Christian in a secure sense. There may be periods in which Christian faith is taken for granted by the people in a nation and in which the public conscience is recognizably Christian. But these periods come and go in the life of the nations or communities that are under the most favorable Christian influences, and these are periods of what we may call "Christian civilization." My second warning is that, if we are thinking of any positive relationship between Christianity and democracy, we must include in our conception of democracy not only the rule of the people but also freedom for minorities, and constitutional protections for the individual conscience. We may put it in this way: only a political democracy that recognizes law above the will of the majority and that interprets that law in ways that are consistent with the Christian conception of the status of the person before God can have Christian sanction. I deliberately express this in minimum terms because I have no expectation that the law will be Christian in the full sense. This is not different in principle from the Catholic insistence upon natural law as the basis for the life of states, but Protestants often differ from Catholics on how natural law is known, and they usually think of natural law in more flexible, or as they would prefer to say, more dynamic terms. Contemporary Protestants would agree with Roman Catholics that democracy as the absolutizing of the will of the people, without seeing the people under

law, is the road to tyranny. Protestants would express the belief that that the law should protect the rights of individuals and minorities to criticize the state and to organize to change the policies of the state. Here Protestants fear Catholic tendencies to protect a "Christian state" from such criticism and from the political opposition of non-Catholic groups. They should admit that in principle early Protestants, except for some sectarian movements, were in this respect no different from Catholics, though the shoe was on the other foot.

What I have said here by way of caution leads me to make this generalization:

Christianity is today favorable to democracy in comparison with other known types of political organization, because only democracy seems to offer the possibility of continuous correction. In comparison with various forms of constitutional aristocracy, democracy encourages continuous correction in the interests of justice to all classes, to classes which, if denied the suffrage, have no effective way of overcoming oppression and neglect. In comparison with a political order which Communists may regard as a people's government, but which still does not protect the rights of minorities, democracy insures continuous correction in the interests of freedom.

One may use the word "democracy" for a dictatorship with a mass base, but this easily becomes tyranny, for within it there is no effective check upon power. At the beginning only a minority may feel the effects of this tyranny but in the end it will be discovered that the majority has no protection either. Correction of dictatorships comes by way of conspiracy and revolution, and the fear of these makes the dictatorship more oppressive.

SOME FACTORS IN CONTEMPORARY CHRISTIANITY WHICH FAVOR DEMOCRACY

I shall now suggest some considerations that support this generalization about Christianity and democracy from recent developments in theology and in the life of the ecumenical Church.

1. The new emphasis upon the universality of sin, if it is never separated from faith that all persons are made in God's image and therefore not allowed to become pious cynicism, is a support for democracy as the provision for continuous criticism of power. We find

here a support for the radical rejection of all forms of irresponsible power, for the denial of the paternalistic interpretation of Christian love that I have emphasized in this paper. This was all said by Lincoln more simply than by the theologians in his words: "No man is good enough to rule another without that other's consent."[2] In the past Christian teaching about sin has usually been accompanied by blind spots that made it difficult to apply it all around in a relevant way. The holders of power were protected by the interpretation of divine providence in terms of Romans 13, and, in more subtle ways, the privileged Christians were protected from the view of themselves and of their privileges that now is forced upon them on all sides. If this teaching about sin were divorced from belief that all persons of all classes and races have the potentiality that comes from their being created in God's image and from the faith in the redeeming activity of God in history, it might easily lead to the cynicism of Thomas Hobbes and hence undermine democracy. Professor Niebuhr has pointed this out clearly and has stated the case for democracy in this context in his epigram: "Man's capacity for justice makes democracy possible; but man's inclination to injustice makes democracy necessary" (*The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness,* p.xi).

2. A second support for democracy comes from the strong resistance to the totalitarian state that has characterized the Churches in our time. I need not recall the story of this because it is well known. Churches in occupied countries resisted, and this was easy because they shared the national hatred of foreign domination, but they also learned something about the relation between Christianity and the state in the process. Christians in smaller numbers and with much greater psychological difficulty resisted in Germany, and they too learned some lessons about the relation between Christianity and the state. There is one lesson that I shall mention here. It is the necessity of freedom for the Church. The European state churches were blasted out of their complacency. Whether or not the Church establishment is to be accepted, it is now seen quite clearly that the Church must develop its own corporate life, that it must be in a position to criticize the state and to resist control by the state in matters that belong to its own sphere, and that its own sphere involves teaching about

2. Speech in Peoria.

justice in the state. It is often said that the Confessional Church in Germany resisted the state on theological and ecclesiastical issues alone. This is most misleading, because included among these issues were the points at which the National Socialist state violated the Ten Commandments. One of the first of the ecclesiastical issues about which the Confessional Church fought had to do with the status of Jewish Christians in the Church. In defending the Jewish Christians the Confessional Church struck at the heart of the racial doctrine of the state.

The Oxford Conference in 1937 outlined the responsibility of the Church to the state while the totalitarian issue was in the mind of everyone. I quote from its report:

> *Duties (of the Church) with reference to the individual state*
>
> These duties are (a) that of praying for the state, its people and its governments; (b) that of loyalty and obedience to the state, disobedience becoming a duty only if obedience would be clearly contrary to the command of God; (c) that of cooperation with the state in promoting the welfare of the citizens and of lending moral support to the state when it upholds the standards of justice set forth in the Word of God; (d) that of criticism of the state when it departs from those standards; (e) that of holding before men in all of their legislation and administration those principles which make for the upholding of the dignity of man who is made in the image of God; (f) that of permeating the public life with the spirit of Christ and of training up men and women who as Christians can contribute to this end" (pp. 70-71).

The experience of recent years has shown the weakness of a Church that is dependent upon the state, especially if its leadership is chosen by the state. Whatever may be the ultimate legal pattern that is developed, the Church is ready in most countries for a more independent position. In Germany there is considerable opposition to the state Church and there is emphasis upon the importance of building the Church as a distinct community. In Norway the Church is controlled by the state in almost everything, and yet it demonstrated that it could go underground and develop its own independent life. This would have been more difficult if it had not had to deal with a foreign oppressor. In England it is doubtful if the Church would take another veto by Parliament of any action involving its worship, and I understand that the Bishops allow the veto of the revised prayer book in 1926 to remain a dead letter. (The English are more likely to allow

the Parliamentary veto over such matters to take its place with the Royal veto as an unused relic than to stage an ecclesiastical revolution.) What I am suggesting here is that the old Church-state relations are generally taking a new form, and that this new form is in the interests of the freedom of the Church. Where the Church is itself organized democratically this change is on the side of democratic freedoms in the nation. Where the Church is in a position to mold the mind of the nation it will in many cases throw its influence on the side of democracy. Karl Barth has come to advocate a conception of the Church which is a pure form of Congregationalism and hence democratic in regard to polity. There is a strong emphasis in European Protestantism on lay participation in the Church and a tendency to criticize the bureaucratic type of state Church. Here I can generalize only about Protestantism as the influence of Roman Catholicism and Eastern Orthodoxy varies from country to country.

I want to say one word about the Russian Church. So long as the Church in Russia was part of a theocratic Church-state, it could not make much contribution to freedom. Today under Communist rule, the Russian Church cannot criticize the state or make any direct contribution to the modification of the present dictatorship. But there are two considerations about the Russian Church today that suggest that, in the long run, it may at least help to develop a measure of pluralism in Russian culture and hence favor democratic tendencies there. First, the Russian Church is less likely to be a mere shadow of the state than was the case under the old regime. It is used by the state in definite ways, in connection with Russian policy in the Balkans for example, but it will probably be more independent of a secular state than it was independent of a theocratic state. Those who still give the Russian Church the benefit of the doubt are convinced that every time the Church is used by the state this is a concession in a process in which the Church is always pressing for maximum freedom. Second, the Russian Church has been given more freedom to organize its own life than it has had since Peter the Great. It now has its own Sobor and can develop as a community that is distinct from the total Russian community. For the first time since the revolution it can train its priests in the open, and now it can more readily educate its people through the liturgy which is the bearer of a whole Christian culture. All of this is precarious because the state

might change its policy again, but even the Russian state can not change its Church policy by sheer fiat if it has to reckon with a widespread religious interest among the people. So, even in Russia, a new pattern of the relation between Church and state is emerging, different from the old Byzantine theocracy and different from the earlier oppressed condition of the Church under the present regime. This has little to do with democracy directly, but it may help to create a more open society in Russia, and hence it may favor the development of freedom to chose between spiritual or cultural or even political alternatives. We must not move from this carefully guarded suggestion into wishful thinking!

A third support for democracy by the contemporary Church is the very character of the relationships between Churches that belong to the ecumenical movement. It has often been shown that the internal polity of Churches has been influential in the formation of the institutions of representative government. I am referring here to something that is somewhat less tangible. Every Church in the World Council of Churches (and that means at the moment 125 Churches, from most of the nations) recognizes that in some sense all of the other Churches in the World Council are Churches. Some do this with more reluctance or ambiguity than others, but this is a presupposition of the whole modern ecumenical development. Over a wide area Churches have come to recognize, not only that other denominations are Churches, but also that they themselves are not indispensable. In this country many of these Protestant denominations have what are called "comity agreements" according to which one denomination will refrain from entering a community and by common consent some other denomination will establish a Church in that community. There will be mutuality in this agreement, and communities are spared the worst effects of denominational competition. What I am concerned to emphasize here is that underlying such an arrangement is the idea that the particular denomination is not indispensable.

This idea raises many problems concerning the relation between religious conviction and tolerance which cannot be discussed here, but, if we compare the situation in the Churches today with what was taken for granted among both Catholics and Protestants in the seventeenth century, we may see that at least one major obstacle to

democracy contributed in the past by Christianity itself has been overcome. It has been overcome within Protestantism. Even in nations in which there are state churches, the free churches have gradually won freedom from most forms of discrimination, although this is not absolute even in such democratic countries as England and Sweden. The relations between Catholics and Protestants raise other issues and remain a threat to a democratic society. That there may be a solution of this problem can be seen in the fact that there are countries which have Catholic majorities, such as Eire and Belgium, which have preserved full religious liberty for the minority faith. There are types of Catholicism, especially among laymen, which are favorable to democracy and religious liberty.

I have tried to show that changes within the Christian Churches have, during the past century, released forces in Christianity that are on the side of democracy. In conclusion I shall point to one deeper element in Christianity which in some contexts may be quite undemocratic in its effect, but which in the context of the changes that I have described is wholly democratic in its influence. Christianity nourishes the social loyalty that is necessary for the health of democracy at the same time that it grounds that loyalty in faith in God who transcends every social group and every center of social power. Since God is understood as willing the welfare of all of his children, the content of service to God is service to the community. But the community is never made absolute, and the government is never made absolute, and so it is possible to combine social loyalty with continuous judgment upon the community, with endless correction of its goals and institutions in the interests of justice and freedom. Today two opposite dangers threaten democracy. One is the irresponsibility of individuals and groups, and the other is the kind of idolatry that absolutizes the particular community or social system. Loyalty to the community under God who transcends and judges the community is a protection against both dangers.

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THE PLACE OF RELIGION IN A DEMOCRACY

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I

IN A DISCUSSION OF THE PLACE OF RELIGION in a democracy, we run the danger of talking at cross purposes. If we want to avert that danger, we must have the courage to start out with a set of definitions of the crucial concepts. Those definitions need not apply beyond the scope of the discussion.

The term "religion" will denote a way of life that is based upon super-empirical values.

A "value" will mean anything whatsoever that is regarded as furthering the achievement of human destiny. What constitutes human destiny is defined differently by each religion.

A "disvalue" will designate whatever is regarded as hindering the achievement of human destiny.

"Super-empirical" is used here to indicate that the values upon which religion is based are not derivable from experience.

The super-empirical values which we assume all religious denominations have in common, and which we are particularly interested in fostering when we try to determine the place of religion in a democracy, are the following: (1) individual responsibility, (2) the dignity of the human individual, and (3) equality as a phase of distributive justice. Why these values should be of particular interest will become evident in the course of the argument.

The term "God" will be used in this discussion primarily to denote the cosmic source and validation of all super-empirical values.

"A democracy" is a form of nationhood dedicated to a way of life based upon certain empirical values, or values which represent forms of experience, among them being those which have served as a basis of the American way of life, viz., life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.

With the foregoing definitions in mind, we shall explore the possibilities of normalizing the status of religion in a democracy.

At the present time the status of religion in a democracy like ours is definitely abnormal. The indeterminate condition of that status cannot

comport with a healthy functioning of religion, nor with a peaceful and harmonious development of our national life. Without at the moment entering into the reasons for the separation of state and church, it is obvious that the interests of religion are not served by that separation, nor is its prestige enhanced.

The area of American civilization where the abnormal status of religion is most disconcerting is obviously that of education. The purpose of education is a twofold one, that of perpetuating and improving the life of the people, and that of enabling the individual to make the most out of his own life. In so far as education means more than training for some vocation, or for any preparatory step toward a vocation, it should involve the whole man. It should not only impart information, but also lay the groundwork for wholesome attitudes and give direction to good character and virtuous habits. By eliminating religion from the curriculum of the elementary and secondary schools we inevitably, even if unintentionally, encourage in the growing generation distorted ideas about religion and a negative attitude toward it.

The present solution of having the schools transmit to the child the scientific, literary, social, and political aspects of the American heritage, and having the church and home transmit to him their religious heritage is an illusory one. It is an evasion instead of a solution. It carries out in a practice a judgment which King Solomon used only as a stratagem to elicit the truth. It, so to speak, cuts up the live body of religion in order to satisfy the rival claims of the different religious denominations.

The purpose which the various religious bodies formerly sought to attain was to qualify their adherents for bliss in the hereafter. It was then taken for granted that to achieve that purpose the religious bodies had to constitute an integral par of the political framework of the state. Religion as understood then, even with the emphasis on the hereafter, was regarded as indispensable to the state, and the state was considered in duty bound to further the interests of that religion. All the more reason is there nowadays for considering religion in the sense defined above—religion which is committed to the purpose of stressing human responsibility, dignity, and equality—as meaningless apart from the institutions, agencies and policies of national life. Those institutions, agencies and policies, on the other hand, when divorced from religion are devoid of what might render them most fruitful of good. To set

such religion apart from the day to day vital interests of men and nations is like refusing to gear a dynamo or engine to any kind of vehicle or tool. To expect religion to use up its energy on itself is to prevent it from functioning normally. Whether it is possible to overcome this abnormal status without trespassing on the principle of the separation of church and state is the problem to which this article addresses itself.

II

The founders of our nation could not have conceived the empirical values of life, liberty, and the pursuit af happiness as free from abuse and as capable of being achieved ethically without the support of inspiration of religion. The statement in the Declaration of Independence which refers to the "laws of nature and nature's God" as entitling each people to a separate and equal station, the statement which speaks of men as being "created equal" and "endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights," the appeal "to the supreme Judge of the world for the rectitude of our intention," and the concluding expression of "firm reliance on the protection of Divine Providence," are not mere lip service to convention. They are the expression of deep conviction, based on the sound intuition, that the validation for their break with their mother country did not derive from factual experience but from some transcendent source. This can be seen from frequent invocations of divine aid, not only in the recorded address but also in the personal and intimate correspondence carried on by the political leaders of those days. The Deism which some of them avowed was not a cold formal profession of half-believed dogmas. It was their way of integrating their religion with their advanced intellectual ideas. The majority of the founders, on the other hand, were professing Christians. That the core of American civilization is far from being secular is proved by the deep religious note sounded in every one of its national hymns. "The Star Spangled Banner" alludes to our land as "Heaven-rescued" and sets up as our motto "In God is our trust." The National Hymn opens with a prayer to the "God of our fathers." The hymn "America" sings of God as the "author of liberty," and "America the Beautiful" invokes God in every one of its stanzas.

It cannot be said, therefore, that the separation of church and state was motivated by an antipathy against religion. On the contrary, it

would be more correct to say that the founders of the nation adopted that principle in the very hope that the people would find a way of being guided and inspired by religion, without having to resort to the various denominations. The very multiplicity and mutual rivalry of those denominations disqualify them from serving in an official capacity as the source of the super-empirical values that a democracy requires. Each church or historical religious body is, as we shall presently show, needed by its own communicants to make them better Americans. But to gear those churches to the *institutions* of American life would be fatal. Nothing would destroy those institutions more effectively, and in less time.

Hence the dilemma in which a democracy like ours is placed. On the one hand, from the religionist's point of view, the empirical values of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness to which a democracy is dedicated are likely to degenerate into disvalues, unless grounded in the super-empirical values which only religion can supply. On the other hand, the only agencies at present ready to provide those super-empirical values are the churches. But if they were permitted to do so, they would wreck our democracy by their rivalries and internecine conflicts.

The contention of those who advocate the gearing of the churches to the machinery of government is that the severance of church from state is intended only to prevent the federal government from dictating to the separate states what they may or may not do to the various churches within their own boundaries. And even that limitation, they contend, has never been interpreted to mean that the federal government must have nothing to do with the churches, nor aid them in any way to attain their objectives. As evidence, they point to the exemption from taxes, to the appointment of chaplains and similar privileges which seemingly refute, or at least qualify, the universal application of the principle of separation of church and state.

To reason thus from the failure to implement a principle effectively to the nullification of that principle is to take unfair advantage of a people's inexperience in dealing with an unprecedented problem. The particular violations of the principle of separation are, indeed, suborned for no other reason than that we have not as yet found a way of having our empirical values as a democratic nation sanctioned by religion. That is why our government calls in the churches to help it. This,

however, should not free us from the task of continuing the search for some way out of the dilemma, a way that will lead us to a religion which will not implicate the churches, though it may have much to learn from them, and may even need them for its own effectiveness.

III

By this time the reader will probably conclude that the only alternative to sectarian religion is some universal religion on which the churches might agree as a next best. That, however, would not solve our problem. In the first place, we must realize that the churches cannot in their present mood give their consent to the teaching of universal religion, for the same reason that none of them likes to be placed on an equal footing with any rival religious sect. A universal religion would, in all likelihood, draw upon itself the antagonism of all the denominations. Even the fact that a universal religion would possess all the elements on which they all agree, and exclude all those on which they disagree, would not help it.

The opposition, however, to a universal religion on the part of the churches might in time be overcome. A more serious objection is the intrinsic one that a universal religion would have to consist of vague generalities which are seldom applied to concrete situations involving moral conflicts. Such a religion has a tendency to remain a way of speaking rather than a way of living. High sounding phrases like the brotherhood of man and the fatherhood of God, or even principles like those of responsibility, human dignity, and justice remain mere pious wishing at best, if they are not integrally associated with a tradition of the collective experience of a people to which one belongs.

Whatever religion we should like to see incorporated in the educational process must offend none of the church religions. It must have *universal* reference. It must consist of principles which would apply to all peoples and races of men, and bring them within the range of sympathy and understanding on the part of our children. But, to be effective, such religion must have *particularity*, the particularity of the life, the strivings, the experience, the travails, the hopes and the ideals of the American people at its best. No religion by itself can be a spring of action; it can only be a guide to action. The spring of action in a person's life has its source in his own nature as shaped by his entire

cultural environment. Any agency or institution which expects to guide his action must derive from the same source of experience as the spring of his actions. *The religion, therefore, which is to guide us in our lives as Americans must derive from our experiences as an American people, in its endeavors to achieve life abundant. In short, it has to be an American religion.*

No sooner mention the term "American religion" than there rises before our mind's eye the ogre begotten of the diabolic marriage of national fanaticism with state idolatry known as fascism or nazism. An ancient Jewish proverb says that one who was bitten by a snake is frightened at the sight of a rope. Despite the justifiable fear, however, which the association of nationhood with religion arouses in us, we cannot afford to allow that fear to paralyze and incapacitate our better judgment and discriminatory faculties. We must retain the ability to discriminate between that which was merely the outcome of an unfortunate combination of historical accidents and that which is the result of inherent necessity. A nation that is animated by religious fervor need not necessarily be totalitarian, nor need a religion which is associated with a nation's life be chauvinistic.

Of course, nationhood may all too easily develop into collective egomania. That, combined with the kind of religion which sanctions it, has been the greatest menace to mankind. On the other hand, is not the very fact that nationhood is capable of becoming such a menace a most compelling reason for bringing it under the control of ethical religion? There is much sound sense in the well-known retort to the fling at religion as being merely a pirate's affair. Who so needs religion as do pirates?

The religion that is indispensable to the life of a democratic nation cannot be one that would sanction any tendency to isolationism or imperialism, to the suppression of freedom of its citizens, or to the repudiation of all international law and responsibility. On the contrary, by the same token that we must discriminate between democratic and totalitarian nationhood, we must also discriminate between ethical and jingoistic religion. There surely is other religion than that of the Moloch type. There is prophetic religion which, far from suborning the crimes of nationhood, could act as a powerful corrective of its evil tendencies. What we desperately need in our educational institutions, as a means not only of sanctioning our national aims but also of cor-

recting their abuses and misinterpretations, is not an abstract universal religion, but one that has particularity and specific reference to the realities of our national career.

IV

It should not be difficult to determine which super-empirical values of prophetic religion have to be stressed in our national life at the present time. All that is necessary is to identify those dangerous tendencies which are most flagrant and most urgently in need of being countered by spiritual efforts and resources. It will suffice to indicate in what follows three such tendencies.

One dangerous tendency which has to be checked is predominantly intellectual in character. Due to the tremendous strides of the sciences during the last two or three centuries, and especially during the last half-century, the human mind is apt to acquire the habit of reducing realities, events and situations to terms lower than those in which they actually function in human life. This habit has, indeed, proved extremely fruitful in scientific research. But when generalized and made to do service in the field of human values, it becomes a kind of disease known as "reductionism" or "scientism."

Unfortunately that habit is not confined to scientists. It has spread to the ordinary run of men. They pick up the jargon of the sciences and bandy it about. They use that jargon to emancipate themselves from the sense of duty and responsibility which it has been the purpose of the historic religions to foster. Their new deities are cause and effect and the other scientific categories which help us to understand the physical world. The realization of the part played by heredity, environment, and circumstances in determining the conduct and character of human beings, and particularly the opening up of the field of the subconscious through the new science of psychoanalysis, no doubt, compel us to reorient ourselves in our world outlook. But, if we carry the methods of biology and sociology into the field of human values and treat human responsibility as an anachronism, we undermine the very foundations of human society.

To counteract that tendency we have to draw upon an intuition which historical religions stress, each in its own way, when they affirm that there is more to reality, especially, to human reality, than can possibly be reduced to scientific formulation. That "more" or "plus" is

the operation of some creative power. Because of its unexpected and unforeseeable character, and its irreducibility to any of the known factors, we may rightly regard it as transcending our empirical experience. By cultivating in the growing generation a sense for the existence of a creative force that transcends the limited range of our experience, and by having them learn to associate that creative force with the ethical urge and the sense of moral responsibility, we would lay the foundation of high character in the minds and hearts of our citizenry. We would thus forestall the danger of automatism or robotism. *If we want our nation to consist of free and self-determining persons, we dare not withhold from our children this awareness of the creative and the transcendent which men have always reckoned with whenever they affirmed the existence of an ethical and spiritual Deity.*

A second tendency in the life of democratic nations which is likely to wreak destruction, unless channeled into a beneficent course by some purpose with which the historical religions have made us familiar, is predominantly emotional in character. That is the supreme emphasis which the modern nation places upon the loyalty of its citizens, an emphasis that implies the demand that the loyalty be, if not exclusive of all other loyalties, certainly supreme. Little did Josiah Royce, the great American philosopher of idealism, dream that the ideal of loyalty, which he regarded as the main source of all moral religious values, would in our generation be so corrupted as to be employed in behalf of the most brutal and bloody assault upon humanity. Yet the fact remains that, despite the vast holocaust of millions of human beings which the perversion of loyalty to state and nation has entailed, not even the democratic nations have grown any less monopolistic in their claim upon the loyalty of the individual citizen.

The growing complexity of the world economy and the progressive intricacy of the world's poliitcal affairs make it necessary for human beings to act in mass. This means that it has become more imperative than ever for the individual to conform, to keep in step. Criticism is frowned on; dissidence is regarded as treason. All in all, the danger of equating democracy with the leveling down of all individuality and difference is greater than ever. Not merely on the battlefield, but also in shop and field, in office and market place, efficiency and power demand that men conform blindly. "Their's not to reason why, their's but to do and die!"

If the democratic nations do not wish to be transformed into a type of society like that which ants and bees have perfected, if they realize that their survival, no less than their growth in mind and spirit, ultimately depends upon the amount of latitude and freedom allowed the individual citizen, then they must keep alive in their civilizations, and foster in their educational system, the basic truth which the historic religions at their best have sought to emphasize: that *each human being is, in part at least, a unique and nonrepeatable entity, a world in himself as well as an end in himself.* Any social or political system which disregards this truth is bound to destroy in the individual that human differentia which the historic religions speak of as the image of God, and with that destroyed, its own destruction is inevitable.

A third tendency in the life of a democratic nation that is in need of being brought under the control of a religious ideal is one which seems to figure most prominently in the volitional phase of life and character. At the opposite pole to the danger of liquidating the individuality of the individual for the sake of the state or nation is the danger of "rugged individualism." That is a survival of Adam Smith's economic philosophy and of the nineteenth century individualism which assumed that, if everybody were permitted to follow the lead of his enlightened self-interest, everybody's genuine interests would be served. Experience, however, has proved that this free-for-all scramble is only a pseudo-democracy, and leads to a social order in which the few, though more than under feudalism, manage to climb to the top of the ladder of success, while the overwhelming number continue to mill around at the bottom of the ladder, without even a chance to step on the first rung.

To counteract this pseudo-democratic laissez-faire tendency, which is really a form of anarchy, a modern nation has to be imbued with the ideal of justice, as the great prophets of Israel envisaged it. The soul of justice is equality. Equality as an ethical concept is the right of every human being to all the available opportunities to bring to fruition whatever potentiality for good he possesses. No wonder that in the Declaration of Independence, our first nation-making instrument, all men are said to have been created equal. Both the language and the sentiment are taken from the Judeao-Christian tradition. The concept of creation reminds us of the transcendent factor that constitutes the human differentia. Applied to the concept of equality, it reminds us

that *equality derives its validation not from experience or expediency but from the super-empirical source to which we trace the human differentia.*

In *The American Dilemma,* the author, Gunnar Myrdal, reveals the chasm that divides our profession of equality from our practice of it. He points out that the very greatness of the ideal has become the occasion for our most cynical rationalizations to cover up our guilt feeling. This situation proves that it is not enough to distill our ideals from our religious tradition. The next step must be to integrate them into the habits of living and thinking of the nation, by incorporating them into legislation, mores, and educational content. That has, as yet, not been attempted on a large scale with the ideal of equality, and will not be, as long as we fail to realize that *a democracy must be religionized through its own institutions.* Only then is what it professes likely to be translated into practice.

V

For a religion to have individuality and to be recognized as such, it must have not only beliefs and ideals but also specific practices which symbolize or signalize those beliefs and ideals. The beliefs and ideals are the soul of a religion, its ontological content; the practices are the body of a religion, which give it its sociological form. What marks off a particular from a universal religion is the possession of body, of distinctive practices, rites and ceremonies. These give it visibility. No doubt it is this particular aspect that the average person usually mistakes for the most significant part of a religion, and much effort has to be expended to shift the emphasis to the content, to the ontological or ethical phase of it. That, however, is as inevitable as is the need of continually being reminded that mind and character and not body make us human. The main weakness of a universal religion is that it is like a disembodied soul. For that reason it is important to embody in concrete American forms or ritual practices the universal values of a super-empirical character, by which we have to control the empirical values of democracy if they are not to run amuck.

This need of supplying the universal values with specific American forms is not merely a practical device, it is based upon a sociological law inherent in the very nature of religion, as it functions in human life. Like language, religion operates in a social medium and is itself a

means of social communication and social unity. Like language, religion is based upon universals, but it acts through particulars. Like the particulars of language, those of religion are various combinations of but a few elements. The elements, in the case of language, are the alphabet. The elements, in the case of religion, are the *sancta* in the people's life and history; they are the alphabet of its religion. Those *sancta* are the heroes, the objects, the texts, the places, the events, and all other foci of collective interest which are regarded as representative of what the people needs to fulfill its destiny, and which the individual needs for the good of his soul.

The Freedom Train, which recently passed from state to state, carrying the most valued documents in American national life, was to all intents a kind of sacred ark carrying the *Torah* of the American nation. It is no exaggeration to call those documents sacred, and to characterize the expedition itself as religious. By what logic can we deny the adjective "holy" to those hymns on which the national consciousness of every American child is fed, and which, in addition to the sense of national solidarity, could become a source of deep religious sentiment, if properly stressed and interpreted. American history, though by no means as long as that of the historic religious communions, abounds in names of heroes. First come to mind the names of those who helped to create the nation and to maintain it in the face of dangers within and without. There have also been heroes of the mind and of the spirit who have contributed to the great cultural and moral wealth of the nation. They too deserve a place in the roster of our national *sancta.* Many places in the land have been consecrated by the sacrifice of blood and tears to be deemed holy. The American calendar is full of days dedicated to precious and highly cherished ideals. We have enough annals, laws and prophesies, psalms and wisdom literature worthy of being canonized as the sacred Writ of the American people. All those *sancta* need no longer shine in the reflected light of holiness which radiates from the experience of peoples and communions that grew up in other lands, and that are part of other histories. They should, henceforth, shine in their own light, which radiates from the struggles, adventures, successes, and frustrations of the American people, and from its efforts to achieve its own destiny.

To shrink from taking the logical step of recognizing all these native resources of the spirit as divine and as the substance of the emerg-

ing American religion, is to waste fructifying energy of the highest order. American religion would not only solidify our people and imbue them with a genuine fellow-feeling for one another; it could also raise its ethical standards, and insure a more serious effort to approximate them. It could prevent our children from growing up either devoid of all religion, or confused and disoriented religiously. The failure to take that step cannot but have ill effects. Energy that is pent up, or wasted, avenges itself by becoming destructive. Figuring as mere patriotism, that energy is liable to be employed in the service of all kinds of bigotries in which hate-ridden individuals and members of the lunatic fringe find an outlet for their insanities. In a sense, all that is here proposed is not intended to urge the *invention* of a new religion. It is rather in the nature of a suggestion *to discover* for ourselves what is actually going on beneath the surface of American life, and to bring it to wholesome fruition instead of ignoring it and letting it run to seed.

VI

What, then, will become of the historical religions? What need will there be for them and their institutions, if there will be an American religion? Those historical religions which claim to be based on supernatural revelation, and to have for their goal the immortality or otherworldly salvation of their communicants, have no reason to fear competition. They have something to offer which lies outside the scope of the proposed American religion. The only ones who have reason to be concerned are those communicants of the historical religions who reinterpret the traditional miracles and concepts of salvation. To them the historical religions are mainly the source of super-empirical values like those enumerated in the beginning of this article. Yet not even they need fear that American religion would render their historical religions superfluous. In so far as those religions carry with them the great historic civilizations, either in whole or in part, they perform a highly valuable function in widening the mental and spiritual horizon of the American citizen. That alone should justify their continued existence.

Moreover, *from the standpoint of the only way in which American religion can come into being, the historical religions will continue to be indispensable for a long time to come.* They are needed as leavening agencies in the American civilization to maintain in it the very process

which will culminate as an American religion. The history of religions and civilizations knows of no civilization in the past in which religion was generated *ab ovo*. We can never say of civilized religion that it owes nothing to any preceding religion. Hence, so long as American religion is in the making—a stage which is likely to last for at least two or three generations—we cannot afford to allow any of the historic religions to fold up. The historical religions have the important role of emphasizing those elements in their tradition which might help American religion to become a force for world unity, no less than for the solidarity of our own people. They might prevent American religion from degenerating into an expression of national megalomania and an instrument of heresy hunting.

All this evidently implies that is possible to be an adherent of more than one religion. This inevitable conclusion from the foregoing argument need not bowl us over. The sense in which we have employed the term religion—as a way of life based upon super-empirical values—does not limit that term to any particular method of validation of those values, or to any exclusive method of salvation. There is, therefore, nothing either intellectually untenable or morally wrong in living in two civilizations, and consequently accepting the religions in which each of them articulates its highest aspirations. It has been aptly stated that the saying about our not being able to serve two masters applies only when one of them is Mammon. The nearer we come to having a united mankind and the closer we approach the subordination of national sovereignties to a federated world, the greater the likelihood of the intermingling of civilizations and religions.

Romanticists and historicists will, no doubt, spurn with contempt the proposal to use what we know of the evolution of religion as a basis for expediting deliberately according to plan the emergence of the American religion. They will, no doubt, pour out their vials of wrathful epithets on such religion, and characterize it as nothing but a synthetic product. Those who feel that way should be reminded that, after all, our own American nation was the first to come into being not through the unconscious process of nature, but as the result of deliberate and planned action. John Quincy Adams made it a point to stress that the Declaration of Independence constituted a "social compact" entered into open-eyed, and that, as a result of it, "a nation was born in a day." This making of a nation by fiat marked the beginning of pur-

poseful planning as a method of political action. Now the time has come to carry that method into the domain of the spiritual. Those who apprehend that religion would be robbed of its mystery and its holiness through this method of planned procedure need only note with what reverence we Americans cherish every symbol and reminder of our national career and destiny, despite the commonplace experiences that led the founders of our nation to call it into being, and despite even the civil war that almost rent it asunder.

Nowadays, democracy, the way of life based upon the empirical values of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, is being challenged by the way of life in which those values are regarded as in need of being entrusted to a bureaucratic dictatorship which is to be the new secularist priesthood. It is, therefore, imperative *to discover* the democratic religion which is in the making and in which each citizen is to be his own priest. In that religion the democratic empirical values would be sanctioned by the super-empirical values of individual responsibility, the sanctity of the person, and equality of opportunity as well as before the law. The various historic religions professed by the American people would, in addition to whatever values they sponsor, have to stress these values in their respective traditions as a means of helping the American religion to emerge, and to forestall the danger of its degenerating into a sanctified chauvinism. On the other hand, the American religion itself will have to grow in vitality, and particularity by means of those *sancta* of elements in our national life which can serve as foci of the sentiments of holiness and faith. In that kind of American religion the empirical values based on "the laws of nature" will be translated into a mode of national life that will deserve the blessing of "nature's God."

BAPTISTS IN SOVIET RUSSIA*

JOHN DAVID HUGHEY, JR.

SINCE THE COMMUNIST REVOLUTION OF 1917, the Baptists and Evangelical Christians in Russia have had a rather checquered career, but on the whole it would seem that they have fared better under the Soviet Government than they did under the tsarist regime. Their story since the Revolution, so far as it is known, appears to be one of alternating freedom of a sort and rigorous suppression. At times it has seemed that their dream of full religious freedom was about to be realized, while at other times it has seemed that all religious freedom was going to be taken away and religion itself uprooted.

When the Revolution came, it was inevitable that there should be a clash between the revolutionists and the Russian Orthodox Church. There had been such a close tie-up between the tsarist government and the State Church that it is not unfair to call the church a department of the state. Naturally when the tsar was overthrown, there was an attempt to overthrow the church which had supported him. The reactionary position of many of the clergy strengthened the resolve to destroy the church.

One of the first acts of the new government was to provide for the separation of the church from the state. The Constitution of the Russian Republic, adopted July 10, 1918, stated (Article 13): "With the object of securing real freedom of conscience for the workers, the church is separated from the state and the school from the church, but freedom of religious and antireligious propaganda is recognized for all citizens."[1] This was a serious blow to the Orthodox Church, but it served incidentally as a great boon to the Baptists and Evangelical Christians. They were, at last, free openly to conduct religious services and to engage in personal and mass evangelism.

The Baptists and Evangelical Christians made good use of their

* This is a part of a longer paper written for the seminar by Mr. Hughey. The author is at present a missionary for the Southern Baptist Foreign Mission Board in Spain.

1. *Konstitutsii RSFSR i SSSR* (Constitutions of the RSFSR and USSR), edited by I. M. Diomidov (Moscow, 1924), p. 12.

new-found freedom. The Rev. Ivan Prokhanoff, the Evangelical Christian leader, in his autobiography shows something of the activity of Evangelical Christians during the period from 1917 to 1929. At one time he got fifty thousand Bibles and New Testaments from Western Christians for distribution in Russia. There were conferences of Evangelical Christians in 1918 and 1919, and there was a joint conference with Russian Baptists at Moscow in 1920. Christian collective farms were established. In 1921 the All-Russian Conference of Christian Young People was held in Tver, with about sixty young people as delegates from various parts of Russia. That religious freedom was not complete is shown by the fact that on the second day of the conference most of the delegates were arrested and taken to prison. In 1922 the Evangelical Christian Bible School was reopened, with seven teachers besides Mr. Prokhanoff. By 1923 there were twenty-seven workers in the offices of the Union of Evangelical Christians. Fifteen thousand copies of *Khristianin (The Christian)* were published each month. The tenth All-Russian Evangelical Christian Conference met in Leningrad in 1926, with five hundred delegates from all over Russia. From 1926 to 1928, with $100,000 which Mr. Prokhanoff raised in America, thirty-five thousand Bibles, twenty-five thousand New Testaments, and a large number of hymnals, church calendars, and Bible concordances were printed and distributed in Russia.[2] A prominent Baptist leader wrote in 1925 that the Baptist movement is like a stream that must flow sometimes underground but "sometimes, as now, [can flow] on the open surface of public life."[3] The Baptist magazine, *The Baptist,* indicates activities for the Baptists just as vigorous as those listed above for the Evangelical Christians.

The Russian Orthodox Synod called a conference in 1925 to consider the success of the "sectarians" in winning members of the Orthodox Church. This was attributed in large part to the fact that the sectarians used "social and political slogans which are akin to the Communist ideas, for which they were formerly prosecuted but which are looked upon with tolerance by the new regime."[4] It is quite ev-

2. I. S. Prokhanoff, *In the Cauldron of Russia* (New York, 1933).

3. P. V. Pavloff, "Concerning Ourselves and Others," *Baptist* (January, 1925), p. 12.

4. J. F. Hecker, *Religion and Communism* (London, 1933), p. 71.

ident that the Baptists and Evangelical Christians fared better than the Orthodox during the early years of the Revolution.

The situation was not yet ideal for the Baptists and Evangelical Christians, however, for the law made Sunday Schools illegal. The Constitution provided for the separation of schools from the Church, and this was interpreted to mean that there could be no classes for the purpose of giving religious instruction to people under eighteen years of age. A class was defined as a group of children exceeding three in number if taught by anyone other than a parent of the children. This was a serious blow to the Baptists and Evangelical Christians, for they relied heavily upon religious training for the young. A way was soon found, however, to get around the law. Special services, consisting of prayers, hymns, the reading of the Bible, and the explanation of it, were arranged for children. The law forbade classes, but it did not forbid church services, and these were church services for children! There were no classes, no regular teacher, and no class rolls.[5]

The antireligious propaganda of the Communists served as an annoyance but did not in the early years of the Revolution seriously interfere with the work and progress of the Baptists and Evangelical Christians. There were antireligious demonstrations, carnivals, open air meetings, seminars museums, and literature. There were debates between believers and atheists, in many of which the atheists came off second best.[6] Antireligious propaganda did not prove so objectionable so long as there was freedom of religious propaganda as well. There is nothing undemocratic about freedom of antireligious propaganda so long as there is also freedom of religious propaganda.

The dream of the Baptists and Evangelical Christians concerning religious freedom approached realization between 1917 and 1929. The Rev. P. V. Ivanov-Klyshnikov reported to the Baptist World Alliance in 1928:

> The constitution of our country decrees and realises in practice the complete separation of the Church from the State. . . . Further, in accordance with the Constitution of the Soviet Republic, every citizen can propagate any religion. Religious freedom and antireligious propaganda is the right of all citizens. . . . We have the full right to hold meetings and teach in them the

5. J. H. Rushbrooke, *Baptists in the U.S.S.R.* (Nashville, 1943), pp. 9 f.
6. Hecker, *op. cit.*, pp. 246-65.

Word of God, and our evangelistic work has already spread beyond the confines of the Russian people and is gradually spreading among the heathens and Mohammedans living in our country. Further, we have the possibility of publishing our periodicals . . . and the Books of Holy Scripture, and also received in 1927 the official authority to open in Moscow a Preachers' School. . . .[7]

In 1929 the tide changed. That year marked an intensification of war on religion in general and the beginning of a special attack on sectarianism. It brought an end to freedom for religious propaganda while leaving freedom for antireligious propaganda. The article on religion was changed to read: "Freedom for religious worship and freedom for antireligious propaganda is recognized for all citizens."[8] This statement was retained in the Stalin Constitution of 1936 (Article 124).[9] A number of laws were passed restricting the activities of religious organizations. Churches were forbidden to form mutual aid associations, to render material aid to their members; to organize special meetings for children, young people, or women; to have special groups for the teaching of religion; to teach any religious creed in state, social, or private schools (except for theological courses, which could be offered by special permission of the Commissar of the Interior).[10] A great variety of official and unofficial measures were taken to bring about the end of religion.

The new measures affected the Baptists and Evangelical Christians fully as much as, and perhaps more than, the Orthodox Church. In the early years of the Revolution they had lost their Sunday Schools, and now they lost their theological schools, their magazines, their right to print the Bible, and their right to engage in general evangelistic activities.[11] Many Baptist and Evangelical Christian leaders were imprisoned or exiled or deprived of food cards, and many churches were closed.[12] The Baptists and Evangelical Christians were singled

7. P. V. Ivanov-Klyshnikov, "The Work and Tasks of Baptists in the U.S.S.R.," *Fourth Baptist World Congress*, edited by W. T. Whitley (Toronto, 1928), p. 76.

8. R. P. Casey, *Religion in Russia* (New York, 1946), pp. 87 f.

9. *Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.* Information Bulletin, Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Washington, 1945), p. 26.

10. Hecker, *op. cit.*, pp. 290-93.

11. J. H. Rushbrooke, "Russia: the Fact and the Technique of Religious Persecution," *The Contemporary Review*, CXXXVII (1930), 426-34.

12. Prokhanoff, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

out for special attack in the antireligious books and magazines. Prokhanoff referred to the period from 1929 to 1933 as the "Time of Great Persecution."[13] The Communists were determined to destroy all religion, including the Baptist and Evangelical Christian variety. Their direct attacks upon the churches and religious leaders and their propaganda continued in full force, with only brief abatements, until 1943, when the war on religion ceased—or almost ceased.[14]

There has been a definite change in the policy of the Soviet Government and the Communist Party towards religion. At the present time there seems to be greater religious freedom in Russia than at almost any previous time. The Russian Orthodox Church has been permitted to reorganize and to elect a Patriarch, and it has received permission to open several seminaries for the training of priests. It seems to have an assured place in Russian life. In October, 1944, the Baptists and Evangelical Christians were permitted to hold in Moscow a joint conference to which forty-five delegates from many parts of the Soviet Union were sent. At this conference it was decided to unite the two groups in the All-Union Council of Evangelical Christians and Baptists.[15] It is significant that the Government permitted this conference. It took place at a time when all conferences requiring travel were forbidden in America. There have been further meetings since this one. The Baptists and Evangelical Christians have been able to perfect their organization and expand their activities without interference from the Government.

Dr. Louie D. Newton, President of the Southern Baptist Convention, was in Russia for twenty-five days last summer as a member of the Russian War Relief delegation of Americans invited to visit the Soviet Union as official guests of the Government. He spoke to overflow crowds in Moscow, Leningrad, and other cities of the Soviet Union. He reported that there seems to be complete freedom of worship, though there is still not freedom to conduct Sunday Schools.[16] Dr. Newton was told that there are now three thousand Baptist and

13. *Ibid.*

14. Louie D. Newton, "What I Saw and Heard in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics," *The Baptist Courier* (October 10, 1946), p. 8.

15. Y. Zhidkov and other members of the Presidium of the All-Union Council of Evangelical Christians and Baptists, Letter to Dr. Walter O. Lewis, November 30, 1944. *The Baptist Courier* (April 19, 1945), p. 3.

16. Louie D. Newton, *op. cit.* (October 3, 1946), p. 7.

Evangelical Christian churches in the Soviet Union, and perhaps two thousand and five hundred ordained ministers.[17] Mr. Zhidkov, President of the All-Union Council of Evangelical Christians and Baptists, told him that, though they could certify only 300,000 baptized members, there were probably not less than two million Russians affiliated with the three thousand churches.[18]

Dr. Newton was given an official letter from the U.S.S.R. Council of Evangelical Christians and Baptists to the Baptists of America. In this letter the Russians list some of the features characteristic of the spiritual life and activity of their brotherhood, and then they say:

> We have complete religious freedom to carry them out day after day. We deeply respect our Soviet Government, which has given us this freedom and protects it from any violation whatever. In our country all churches and religions enjoy equal and complete freedom. Because of this freedom we have a flourishing spiritual life in our churches. There is a great fire that burns in the hearts of our believers. The Gospels are preached freely, and thousands of sinners repent and turn to Christ. There is not a single church of ours which does not have its conversions. We have information that during the first half of this summer already thirty thousand newly converted souls were baptized. And an equal number will be baptized during the second half of this summer.
>
> We publish a journal "Bratsky Vestnik" (Brotherly News), which carries throughout the Soviet Union the news of our work and the blessings received from the Lord.
>
> We are publishing the Bible, the New Testament, and books of spiritual songs. We shall continue to publish these until we have satisfied all need for this material.
>
> We shall soon open a school to train our preachers. The Orthodox Church has anticipated us in this respect, but we shall soon catch up to it.
>
> Just as we do spiritual work, we also do charitable work. Regular monthly offerings are made in all our churches for the children of soldiers who died during the war. These offerings provide large sums.[19]

Religious freedom is still not complete. As we have indicated, there are still no Sunday Schools or any other provision for the religious training of children outside the home. There is no evidence of freedom for ministers and churches to deal with political and social ques-

17. *Ibid.* (October 10, 1946), p. 8.

18. *Idem,* "An American Baptist Visits Russian Baptists," *The Commission* (November, 1946), p. 289.

19. Zhidkov, Y., and other members of the Presidium of the All-Union Council of Evangelical Christians and Baptists, Letter to the Baptists of the United States of America. *The Baptist Courier* (Nov. 21, 1946), pp. 6 f.

tions. The magazine now being published by the Baptists and Evangelical Christians *(Bratsky Vestnik)* indicates a complete preoccupation with "personal religion." There is, however, so much more freedom than the Baptists and Evangelical Christians have been accustomed to that they cannot help feeling that their dream of full religious freedom is in process of realization. Dr. Newton reports that the Baptist leaders said to him:

> We do not undertake to say what our Government intends, but we do most gratefully report to you that we are now enjoying a measure of freedom unknown by the Baptists in all the years of our witness in Russia. . . . We are free to preach what we believe, and other religious groups appear to enjoy the same freedom. It is our fervent hope and belief that this freedom will continue, and expand. . . .[20]

The friends of the Russian Baptists and Evangelical Christians join with them in hoping for a continuation *and expansion* of religious freedom in the Soviet Union.

CHANGE OF POLICY BUT NO CHANGE OF BASIC PHILOSOPHY

There has undoubtedly been a change in policy on the part of the Communists toward religion. They are no longer fostering propaganda against religion or attempting by direct or indirect action to close churches. So far as we can determine, however, there has been no change in the basic philosophy of Communism. It continues to be materialistic and atheistic. The official philosophy of Communism is Dialectical and Historical Materialism.[21] This means that nature and human history are interpreted from a purely materialistic point of view. There is no place in the universe for God.

Yaroslavsky, for so many years the leader of the godless movement in the Soviet Union, spoke out in no uncertain terms about the contradiction between the world view of the Communist and that of the religious person:

> The conception of the world from the religious viewpoint is incorrect; it is a mutilated understanding of the world and of the mutual relationships of

20. Newton, "What I Saw and Heard in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics," *The Baptist Courier* (October 10, 1946), p. 8.

21. "Dialectical and Historical Materialism," *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union,* ed. by Commission of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. (New York, 1939), pp. 105-31.

men. A person cannot act correctly, cannot act in an organised manner as a Communist, as a Leninist, if his brain is poisoned by religion. In order to overcome the tremendous difficulties which confront us; in order to remould the world as the working class and the peasantry want it to be; in order to subjugate all the forces of nature and compel them to work for the welfare of mankind; in order to change social relations from top to bottom; in order to eradicate war between nations, to exterminate poverty from the face of the earth—it is necessary that every person, that every peasant see things as they are, without the intervention of Gods, saints, angels, fiends, werewolves, and other spirits, good or evil.

Religion acts as a bandage over the eyes of man, preventing him from seeing the world as it is. It is our task to tear off this bandage and to teach the masses of workers and peasants what does exist and what does not, so as to be able to rebuild this world to fit the needs of the workers and peasants. We must, therefore, convince the masses that Communism and religion cannot go together, that it is not possible to be a Communist and at the same time believe in devils or gods, in heavenly creatures, in the Virgin Mary, in the saints, in pious princes and princesses, bishops, and landowners, who have been canonised by the priests.

. . . It is impossible to be a Communist, a Leninist, and retain the belief that the conditions of life, of society, of industry, the weather or an individual's health, can be influenced by prayers, by sprinkling "holy water," by burning incense, or by performing other superstitious rites.[22]

There is no evidence that present-day Communists would repudiate the above statement by Yaroslavsky. Between Communism and Christianity there is and will probably continue to be a basic conflict in ideology. The world views of the two systems are completely antithetical. Unless Communism should give up its basic philosophy of Dialectical and Historical Materialism—and this appears altogether unlikely—there is no possibility of a reconciliation of Communism and Christianity on the ideological plane.

There has been, however, a relaxation in the struggle against religion. It is difficult to determine with certainty the reasons for this. The change of policy might have been due to a belief that the old policy of propaganda and oppression had failed or, on the other hand, to a conviction that the power of organized religion had been broken. Perhaps it was due to a realization that religion is less dangerous when it is permitted to flow on the surface of public life than when it must go underground. The desire to gain unity in the nation, especially during time of war, and the desire to gain good will abroad might

22. E. Yaroslavsky, *Religion in the U.S.S.R.* (London, 1932), p. 29.

have had a good bit to do with the change of policy. Perhaps it was due to a recognition that the churches were no longer counter-revolutionary and that the political-social arguments which had been used against them were no longer significant. This was probably the chief factor back of the change of policy regarding religion.

During the time when such a great effort was being made to destroy religion, the strongest arguments against religion were social and political ones. The churches were said to be led by members of the former privileged classes, to have opposed the proletarian Revolution, to have attempted to undermine the authority and power of the Soviet Government, to have hindered collectivization and industrialization, and to have hindered the cultural revolution.[23] The Baptists and Evangelical Christians were charged with seeking to evade their obligation to fight in the Red Army by claiming that they were pacifists, whereas they had fought willingly in the tsarist army. In short, religion was condemned as a counter-revolutionary force.

Most of these arguments have lost their force. The churches are not led by members of the former privileged classes, for these have been liquidated. The collectivization of agriculture has been achieved, and the Christians have fitted into the collective farms. It would seem that the Christians are absolutely loyal to the Soviet Government, and the Baptists and Evangelical Christians have dropped their opposition to military service. During the recent war the Evangelical Christians and Baptists passed the following resolution:

> The Conference of Evangelical Christians and Baptists, upon listening to the letter of the General Secretary of the Baptist World Alliance, Dr. W. O. Lewis of Washington, describing the great patriotism of the Baptists of the United States of America who have sent into the American army about a million members of Baptist churches, now valiantly fighting on land, on sea, and in the air in defense of their homeland, many of whom have already given their lives in the battle against the enemy, notes with satisfaction the equal patriotism of the Russian Evangelical Christians and Baptists serving in great numbers in the heroic Red Army and engaged in the armed struggle for the fatherland, and who, too, have performed numerous deeds of valor for which many have been decorated with orders and medals.
>
> The Conference honors by rising the glorious memory of the members of the Evangelical Christian and Baptist churches fallen in battle and the members of their families, and expresses the firm conviction that the example of

23. A. T. Lukachevskii. (ed.), *Antireligioznyi uchebnik* (The Anti-religious Textbook), (Moscow, 1933).

these Christian patriots will be followed by all the brethren and sisters of the Union of Evangelical Christians and Baptists, and that these, sacrificing everything, even life when necessary, will forge together with their country the full and final victory over the inhuman enemy—fascism.

The Conference reaffirms the devotion of Evangelical Christians and Baptists to the principles expressed in the resolutions of the Conference of 1926 concerning the military question.[24] And we reaffirm the patriotic messages sent out by the All-Russian Union of Evangelical Christians and Baptists during the great war for the fatherland. We will continue to work to make these principles the legacy of all Evangelical Christians and Baptists without exception.[25]

The Baptists and Evangelical Christians either do not wish to oppose the Soviet Government or do not dare to do so. They cannot be justly accused of being counter-revolutionaries. Their social ideals in many instances coincide with those of the Communists. Since the social-political arguments against them are no longer valid, it is possible that the Communists will overlook the basic ideological conflict between Communism and Christianity and that the present armistice in the war on religion may develop into something like a permanent peace. This is possible but by no means certain. In the meantime, the Baptists and Evangelical Christians will continue to dream of full religious liberty.

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24. The possibility of military service for Christians was recognized, and the actual decision regarding such service was left up to the individuals concerned.

25. "Resolution on the Letter of Dr. W. O. Lewis," *The Baptist Courier* (April 19, 1945), p. 3.

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THE RELATION OF RELIGION TO DEMOCRACY AND COMMUNISM IN THE WRITINGS OF JOHN MACMURRAY: A REVIEW ARTICLE

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THE SEMINAR ON RELIGION AND DEMOCRACY has generally discussed democracy without defining it, on the assumption that general experience gives a better basis of understanding than formal definition. This is probably correct. As Nietzsche has said, it is difficult to define something that has a history. However, it is at least worth taking notice that for "the other half" democracy means something very different from what it means in the experience of most Americans. The bandying about of the word in international conferences might lead one to concur with Lewis Carroll's Humpty-Dumpty that "when I use a word it means just what I choose it to mean—neither more nor less." But it should be possible, without equating democracy with secret police, to inquire into the significance of its meaning in terms of economic democracy, especially in socialistic and communistic terms, and to look at the relation of religion to this aspect of democracy.

The problem has been confused in recent history by the hostility of the Soviet Union to formal religion, and the reciprocal hostility of large parts of the church—especially Roman Catholic— to the Soviet. For our present purpose, this only obscures the issue of the meaning of economic democracy. In passing it may be noted that this conflict has often been exaggerated, in view of significant leftist groups within the churches who have been friendly, sometimes even uncritical, toward the Soviet Union. Large groups within the churches have attempted to preserve a balanced judgment. It is worth attention that *Commonweal,* liberal Roman Catholic journal, gave a more critical review to James Burnham's *Struggle for the World* than did *Nation.*

In the writings of John Macmurray[1] we find one of the significant contemporary attempts to draw Christianity and communism together.

1. Macmurray's published works from 1926 until 1947 have been consulted. The more important writings on the subject under discussion are indicated in the footnotes.

Macmurray, who was for many years professor of philosophy at the University of London, has more recently succeeded Norman Kemp Smith at Edinburgh. He was the prophet of the British group which called itself "The Christian Left" and regarded a communistic economic system as the proper expression of Christianity. He has been a popular speaker on the BBC and has written or collaborated in more than a dozen books, about half of them directly on this subject and all touching upon it somewhere.

Some of Macmurray's writings have been interpretations of Karl Marx, and have come in for severe criticism. He emphasizes especially the young Marx, and by use of some of his lesser known writings attempts to show that Marx's hostility to religion was not so complete as is usually thought, that Marx really attacked a distorted religion, and that he actually adopted much of the essential intention of Judaism and Christianity which the churches had obscured. However, Macmurray makes a very selective choice of passages to uphold his point. To refer to an earlier criticism in this journal, Corliss Lamont thinks that Macmurray brings together Christianity and Marxism by using a severely truncated version of each.[2]

However, for our present concern the accuracy of the interpretation of Marx is of slight consequence. The question is: What is the relation of Western religion—Christian and Jewish—to socialist and communist thought today? The question may be divided into two aspects: (1) The ethics of religion and of communism; (2) The philosophy of history.

ETHICS

Macmurray has stated that Christianity and Communism are related to each other in terms of a dialectical opposition which demands a synthesis.[3] The real contradiction to Communism is Fascism. So far from Christianity being the contradiction to Communism, Christian-

2. See his review of *Creative Society* in *Review of Religion,* I (1937) 198-201. Cf. Elizabeth Lam, "Does Macmurray Understand Marx?," *Journal of Religion* XX (1940). 47-65. A recent short book by a social radical with a more normative interpretation than Macmurray's of both Marx and Christian theology is Alexander Miller's *The Christian Significance of Karl Marx* (New York, 1947). The book contains some specific criticisms of Macmurray.

3. "Christianity and Communism: Towards a Synthesis" in *Christianity and the Social Revolution,* ed. by John Lewis *et al.,* (New York, 1936) p. 506.

ity, as the fascists say, breeds liberalism, which breeds socialism, which breeds communism.[4] He is convinced that Marx drew much of his ethic from Feuerbach's secularized version of Christianity, and quotes Marx's pun that no one could reach the true Communist position without being baptised in the *Feuer-bach* (fire-brook).[5] He readily grants that the contemporary form of Christianity is incompatible with Communism, but holds that the needed synthesis of Christianity and Communism would actually reform Christianity in the direction of its own true nature. This synthesis, he says, "would transform Christian practice in a way that would make it much more nearly the expression of its own professed ideals; and it would transform Communist theory in a way that would much more adequately express the actual nature of the form of practical life that it seeks to realize."[6] More particularly, Christianity would abandon otherworldliness, refer itself directly to human relationships, and take more cognizance of the hunger-urge and its economic manifestations. Communism would in turn take more account of the love-urge—of those human relationships which are not purely economic, and of the elements of life which are not exhausted within organization.

Where does Macmurray get the right to define the essence of Christianity as he does? He claims to find this in its origin in Judaism, in the teachings of Jesus, and in the creative impulses which launched it into the Western world and have never completely left it. The intention of Jesus was to realize the Kingdom of God. This, in Jesus' teaching, is "the universal community of mankind based on the sense of unity between man and man, and expressing itself in the sharing of the means of life to meet human needs."[7] So far from being a mere other-worldly ideal, this Kingdom "is the expression of the true nature of man himself and, therefore, it is grounded in the nature of reality. The creation of the universal family is the meaning of the religious impulse."[8] Thus Macmurray regards Jesus as "a social reformer choosing and accomplishing his line of action for establishing

4. *Ibid.*, p. 507. Also *The Clue to History* (New York, 1939), p. 206.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 509.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 511.
7. *Creative Society. A Study of the Relation of Christianity to Communism* (New York, 1936), p. 62.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 62.

the Kingdom of Heaven."[9] In the practical situation with its various possibilities for action, Jesus' "emphasis fell upon the necessity of creating first the inner conditions in the Jewish people which must precede the coming of the Kingdom."[10] The core of the teaching is *intentional love,* which "becomes the motive force behind the intention to create the kingdom of heaven, the community of mankind."[11] Since love is the truest expression of human nature, this means that if men will "accept their own reality and live by it they will find that the kingdom of heaven has come on earth."[12]

How does this relate to democracy? It means that the practical mission of Christianity "is to seek to realise the family unity of mankind on earth."[13] "Christianity is inherently a *revolutionary* religion seeking the achievement of a world community. It is *about* a new society that has to be brought into being through the transformation of existing societies."[14] Its two effects are *universalism* and *democracy.* Thus Macmurray states unequivocally: "If Christianity controlled human life it would certainly create a democratic, classless society, because only such a society corresponds to its own meaning."[15]

In practical, political terms, Macmurray finds that "The main structural principles of Communism are either identical with, or implied in, those of Christianity."[16] These structural principles are, primarily, freedom and equality, "the keynotes of democracy."[17] Macmurray has no difficulty in showing that freedom is a recurrent emphasis in the Gospels and St. Paul, and that it is construed not individualistically but in terms of community. Similarly, the idea of equality is common. Inequality of *function* is obvious and necessary, and the Hebrew-Christian writings recognize this; but they do not allow it to be translated into inequality of personality.[18] Jesus' teaching "demands such a distribution of functions and such a distribution of wealth as

9. *Ibid.,* p. 75.
10. *Ibid.,* p. 76.
11. *Clue to History,* p. 67.
12. *Clue to History,* p. 83.
13. *A Challenge to the Churches: Religion and Democracy* (London, 1941), p. 21.
14. *Ibid.,* p. 42.
15. *Ibid.,* p. 46.
16. *Christianity and the Social Revolution,* p. 508.
17. *Challenge to the Churches,* p. 9.
18. *Clue to History,* pp. 70-82.

will prevent any member of society from assuming or achieving a *personal* superiority over any other."[19]

To these interpretations, some of which would find wide acceptance, Macmurray adds the more original insistence that Jesus was essentially a dialectical thinker. Although the language may sound rather incongruous as an interpretation of the New Testament, Macmurray finds in Jesus "a very clear insistence on the dialectical reversal of situation in the time process."[20] Applying the dialectic to history, Jesus united the principles of growth and cataclysm. He was not a moralist, he practically never used the word *ought* and seldom spoke in the imperative; rather he used indicative statements about the character of reality and the process of history. "The meek shall inherit the earth" is not a moral glorification of meekness, but a statement about who shall inherit the earth in the dialectical process. The dialectic is applied especially in economic terms. Jesus shows no unworldly attitude toward wealth, but a condemnation of the wealthy and powerful. Wealth is a barrier to the kingdom. "And while it is perhaps true that he never attacked with bitterness any individual, it is also true that his class attacks are almost unrivalled in literature for the bitterness of their invective."[21]

These, then, are the likenesses between Christianity and Communism. Two differences are worth mentioning. First, a Christian Communism would be more democratic than a non-Christian one, because it is more concerned with the individual than a Communism which makes the individual instrumental to society.[22] Christianity, however, will never take the form of modern individualism.[23] Second, orthodox Communism emphasizes violent revolution. Christianity does not deny that revolution may be necessary, but it lacks Communism's simple faith in revolution, and looks for other possibilities of social change.[24]

What are we to make of all this? (I have omitted some of Macmurray's glowing remarks about Russia, written in the 1930's; his latest writings are somewhat more critical and recognize the desirability of a

19. *Creative Society*, p. 95.
20. *Ibid.*, p. 67.
21. *Ibid.*, pp. 73-74. See also preceding pages.
22. *Creative Society*, pp. 136-42.
23. *Clue to History*, pp. 172 ff, 198.
24. *Creative Society*, p. 144.

more pluralistic society with more emphasis upon democratic liberties.[25]) But what of the interpretation of essential Christianity? Probably no New Testament scholar would concur in all of his remarks. But we may qualify his description of Jesus as a sort of proto-Marx, and still acknowledge the Gospel's bias against the wealthy, and its impulse to freedom and equality. The Marxist ideal of the classless society—"From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs"—has obvious likenesses to the Christian ideal—however practical or impractical either system may consider its achievement. We may reject the idea that Jesus aimed to be mainly a social reformer, and that his conception of the organization of society could have much direct application to an industrial age which unites several continents in one civilization. Having done this, we may still insist that his teachings do contain the impulse toward many of the goals of economic democracy, together with an insistence that religion demands action in personal relations. Although Jesus never thought in terms of organizing the means of production, his teachings probably have a *more direct* implication for economic than for political democracy.

That this impulse is part of the historic continuity and creativity of Christianity is evidenced by the fact that a conservative Church has repeatedly given birth to radical movements and sects with equalitarian principles. Toynbee points out the recurrent emergence of a socialistic motif in Christianity, starting in the New Testament. He quotes a letter of the Emperor Julian the Apostate referring to extensive philanthropic and socialistic tendencies among the Christians.[26] He maintains that in France, England, Germany and the rest of Western Europe, socialism first appeared as religious socialism; only in Russia did it start as an imported philosophy—a Marxist philosophy which Toynbee insists had considerable Jewish-Christian rooting.[27] We may combine this with the late Archbishop Temple's statement—probably not meant to be one hundred percent accurate, but revealing

25. The latest addition to Macmurray's thought about Russia comes in a pamphlet, *A Crisis of Culture: The USSR and the West* (London, 1947). The pamphlet states that the problems of reaching an understanding with Russia grow out of contrasting cultural traditions, in which such basic ideas as that of "freedom" have entirely different meanings. Macmurray sees the only possible solution outside a forced, totalitarian one to be the gradual formation of a common cultural tradition. This he hardly expects to come before another war.

26. *A Study of History*, Vol. v (London, 1939) pp. 581-87.

27. *Ibid.*, p. 177, n.

—that Christianity is the most materialistic of all great religions, and the significance of religion in its relation to economic democracy is obvious.

These observations make all the more pressing the question: Why did organized Christianity get so far off the track, until it has been recognized by Marxism as an opiate and by most radical movements as a conservative force? The answer to this depends upon a brief look at our second problem, the interpretation of history.

INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY

The interpretation of Marxism as secularized apocalypse has become common. Toynbee regards it as best understandable on the basis of Jewish apocalyptic thought, modified by Christian apocalypse and Hegelian dialectic. Reinhold Niebuhr has pointed out rather detailed parallels with the Christian interpretation of history. Frank Tannenbaum, from a quite different point of view, has called the Marxist view "a translation to the mundane world of the underlying theology of the Christian doctrine, and calling it economics and science."[28]

Macmurray also gives this interpretation, along with some different emphases. His own philosophy of history seems to combine—sometimes rather awkwardly—a strictly modern conception of progress, a Marxian dialectic, a Jewish-Christian idea of the sovereignty of God, and an occasional empirical-sociological analysis. I shall touch on only one aspect of it which relates to our topic—the problem of otherworldliness. Macmurray insists that the genuine religious consciousness—of which the Jews give us the only example in history—sees the world as an integral unity, with no split between two worlds or between natural and supernatural. The proof of the fully religious character of Judaism is that there is no clear reference to another world or a future life in the Old Testament. The Jews were capable of thinking *this* world religiously.

The Christian apocalyptic idea grew out of this Jewish religious consciousness. It signifies that God's intention for history will be fulfilled, "through the overcoming of the opposition of man's will to God."[29] The apocalyptic element is the affirmation of the inevitabil-

28. *Political Science Quarterly*, LXI (1946), 498.
29. *Clue to History*, p. 53.

ity of achievement of God's Kingdom. "Its coming is inexorable, not by divine intervention but by the structure of reality which reveals the inevitable interconnection between elements of historical process."[30] Jesus' apocalyptic emphasis is simply the insight into reality which is also foresight.[31]

Whereas the Communist apocalypse is entirely future, making all contemporary history instrumental to the future kingdom, Christian apocalypse is partly present.

> The Kingdom of Heaven is at once the truth about human nature and the distant goal of human development. It is true that "the Kingdom of Heaven is within you." It is equally true that the Kingdom of Heaven is not yet come on earth. It is only by holding together these two antithetical aspects of human experience that the religious nature of human life can be realized.[32]

The great apostasy within Christianity was the surrendering of this integral world-view for a dualistic one, in which the Kingdom *of* Heaven became a Kingdom *in* Heaven, and the unregenerate world was left to go its own way. Idealism, and all forms of dualism, are the arch-perversion of Christianity.

Why did Christianity—and most other religions, for that matter—do this? Macmurray makes minor suggestions that the temptation arose out of a genuine situation. The inner reality of the religion demands a universal human community, while the outer reality of the world shows the opposite. Thus men are tempted to escape the dichotomy—either through a retreat into other-worldliness (the Protestant danger) or by making religion an institution with temporal power (the Catholic danger). Either has disastrous consequences for true religion, and obviously for democracy.[33]

But more common is what we may call a false temptation. Social class-dualism is the real devil. When a society accepts class dualism, its thought becomes dualistic. God, who for the Hebrew was a worker, becomes an aristocrat, and religion becomes undemocratic.[34] The Christian Church succumbed to this temptation when it allowed itself to become the religion of the Roman empire, and linked itself

30. *Ibid.*
31. *Ibid.*, p. 92.
32. *Creative Society*, pp. 63-64.
33. *Creative Society*, pp. 111-15.
34. *Clue to History*, pp. 32-33.

with the ruling classes. Its theology, at the same time, was formed under influence of Greco-Roman philosophies, reflecting also the prejudices of thinkers who idealized contemplation.[35] Henceforth,

> By limiting itself to a purely spiritual function, and so resigning to the state the material ordering of society, the new community of creative Christianity could be represented as a purely spiritual community belonging to "another world" and to "another life." This way of giving to Christianity a supernatural and other-worldly reference is an effective way of saying to the State that Christianity has no intention of interfering with the social ordering of life, and to the Church that it need not be troubled in its conscience when it supports an economic and political order which plainly contradicts its own teaching.[36]

But this pious fraud has now recoiled upon the churches.

> The Church has created the demand for the classless society of a universal brotherhood in the hearts of men, but has bidden men look to the secular power for the ordering of life on earth. The Church itself has decided that the effort to establish the Kingdom of Heaven on Earth shall be a purely secular effort, and that so far as it distracts men's minds from the pursuit of spiritual aims it is an effort which she must condemn and oppose. Why then should we be surprised that the revolutionary movements of our time are anti-religious, anti-Christian and materialist? The Church has willed it so.[37]

What is the validity of this interpretation? Again New Testament scholarship would not support Macmurray's interpretation of Jesus. Although the trend in part is away from the radical apocalypticism of some years ago toward a realized eschatology, it seems evident that Jesus did believe in the supernatural in a sense that Macmurray does not. However, Macmurray is correct in saying that Jesus was not a dualist in the modern sense, and that his conception of the world and God was an integral one. But as before, the historical problem is a minor one. I am rather interested in looking at the contemporary situation and asking the question, of whether an element of so-called other-worldliness, or emphasis upon the radical transcendence of God, is hostile to democracy.

This is not primarily an intellectual philosophical problem. For example, our theologians who value the idea of the supernatural could

35. *Ibid.*, pp. 127-45.
36. *Challenge to the Churches*, pp. 49-50.
37. *Ibid.*, pp. 50-51.

come to agreement with our ardent philosophical naturalists on this statement of Macmurray's:

> It is one thing to realize that the world in which we live is wider and deeper than we know, and that there may be whole reaches of it and aspects of it which are hidden from our normal consciousness. It is quite another to hold that there is another world which is not this world at all.[38]

The whole problem is one of how seriously we are going to take such statements and the symbolism with which religion accompanies them. In all of his many books, Macmurray permits himself this sort of statement only twice.[39] But with tiresome monotony he objects to idealism, supernaturalism, and dualism. It is clear where he thinks the danger lies. Our question then is not mainly a metaphysical one, but genuinely a question of religion and democracy.

Obviously some other-worldliness devaluates historical life or excludes it from religion, and makes impossible any relation of religion to democracy. But I should like to maintain that an element of the transcendental or so-called "other-worldly" may be essential to a faith which can maintain a democracy. Of course this is not true if democracy is simply a mode of adjusting disagreements and regulating common affairs when no one really believes anything, as Spengler describes it when he finds it characteristic of historical periods when both religion and culture are in decline. But if democracy is to demand the loyalty of its citizens—and sometimes their lives—it must claim to embody values which in some sense give meaning to life and do not merely serve life. In contrast to the complete this-worldliness of, for example, Epicureanism, it must face life with a concern which is more than something which pleases me while I happen to be alive; in this sense, at least, it must embody a faith in the super-temporal.

Further, a conception of the transcendent God can have a strong democratic significance. It has been suggested that the recognition of any divine "Thou shalt" is intrinsically anti-democratic—a religious correlate of the *Führer-prinzip*. But so far from the *Führer-prinzip* being an expression of transcendent religion, it may represent

38. *The Structure of Religious Experience* (New Haven, 1936), p. 67.

39. See also his chapter on immortality, *Reason and Emotion* (New York and London, 1938). Elsewhere he refers to the *eternal* aspects of life, but uses the term much less explicitly.

immanence run wild—the immanent spirit of *this* people, *this* race, *this* movement, exalted to the place which most religion reserves for the transcendent. It is the relative made ultimate, with no truly transcendent principle to judge it. Contemporary theologies, with their reaffirmation of the transcendence of God are not insisting upon a dualistic metaphysics, in which a heavenly world sits above an earthly world, like the two layers of a cake. The insistence is rather upon aspects of religious truth and experience which make an ultimate claim upon man—a claim which cannot be rejected by mere personal or group preferences. The neglect of this aspect of religion usually leads (as it does for Macmurray) to failure to see the significance of the Jewish-Christian conception of sin, and to consequent utopianism almost as unrealistic as that of orthodox Marxism.

An illustration will bring out this problem in Macmurray's thought. The history of the Soviet Union has recently made him concerned about maintenance of liberty. In the older liberalism he feels that the exclusion of government from dominance over economic life and religion has been a mark of democracy. In the inevitable socialism of the future, he says, government will dominate economic life. How then can we preserve democracy? By keeping religion free, and elevating it to greater significance in life. But it must be a religion completely free from dualism and other-worldliness. The character of this religion will be the manifestation of the social character of human nature, the concern of the brotherhood of man. At this point John Middleton Murry asks how such a religion differs from the inner spirit of communism, and how it can produce the corrective to communism.[40] This, it seems to me, is the problem of religions concerned to be completely this-worldly. If religion aspires to move the world, it cannot use the world as its fulcrum. Here Macmurray might well re-examine the meaning of biblical apocalypse. There is more significance than he realizes to his quotation from Scripture: "Call no man master, for one is your master, even Christ, and all ye are brethren."[41]

In conclusion, let me say that although I cannot agree that Christianity is primarily a social program for economic democracy, or that it prescribes any system of economic control, only a sadly onesided

40. Review of *Challenge to the Churches,* in *The Adelphi* (Series 3) XVIII (1941), 15-16.

41. *Challenge to the Churches,* p. 45.

representation of Christianity can ignore its clear implications for economic democracy. The fact that the Church has often done just this is easy to understand. It is the tendency of all revolutions to become conservative—whether they be bourgeois, proletarian, or religious revolutions. Christianity, despite its institutionalism, still gives rise to leftist groups. Denominational colleges, student camps and conferences, Y.M.C.A. groups, constantly influence students to a concern for economic democracy. To quote Macmurray once more, "Thus every critic of the Church who points out this contradiction between the Churches' creed and their social effect, is a witness that Christianity is a creative and revolutionary religion and that if it functions in a conservative fashion something has gone wrong with it."[42] That this something does go wrong with it so often is simply an evidence of the universal tendency of people to rationalize their own interests. Communism calls it ideology; religion calls it sin.

42. *Ibid.*, p. 48.

BOOK REVIEWS

Free Religion—An American Faith. By Stow Persons. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1947. vii, 168 pp. $3.00.

Major religions are not easily created. They come as the product of inspiration and perspiration, psychological wisdom and political sagacity, applied at a moment when for cultural reasons a prepared soil is waiting. It is scarcely to be wondered at that, in its brief independent existence, the United States of America has not succeeded in producing even one major religion, though, as befits a mass production economy, it has proliferated minor sectarian and schismatic movements within the older traditions and has even developed a few original cults of limited appeal. We stick to our two major parties in religion as well as in politics, and third or minor parties in each gain their small prestige over a small area, during a brief period.

But just as we learn much about the political concerns of the unimportant common man by studying the minor parties which embodied those needs and demands in which the important people could see no merit, so we learn much about the religious needs of the American public by studying those minor religious movements which give concrete expression to everything from its deepest spiritual needs to its wildest exhibitionistic vagaries. Of all the spectrum of sects and the gamut of needs they represent, many students have found the most interesting to be those which attempt to embody spiritually the cardinal American political tenet of freedom.

For let us be honest about this: despite the dialectic of latter day apologists, the major religious traditions, the "historic religions," of the western world are incurably authoritarian. If, in a period like today and in a place like the United States, theological apologists are busily bustling about proclaiming their "democratic" character, this is to be regarded in the same way as a politician's concern for "the people" in an election year. The very fact of the survival of these religions through many changes of political organization would tend to show that it is not democracy which is of their essence, but rather the chameleon ability to accept whatever external government may rule, in the secure knowledge that their internal structure of authority remains untouched. The historic religions have always given unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's.

Yet freedom must be celebrated by men as the greatest of their yet unrealized ideals, and freedom cannot be adequately celebrated in an authoritarian church. And so, on the borderline of American religion, there have developed from time to time religions of freedom, whose very freedom, unfortunately, was and had to be the principle of their disintegration as well as of their organization. For, in order properly to celebrate freedom, these had to be free religions, free from dogma, free from clerical domination, free from financial control, free from creed, free from the yoke of revelation. The wonder is not that they disintegrated as soon as they did, but that they lasted as long as they did.

Professor Stow Persons, of Princeton, has earned the gratitude of every student of American religion by telling in careful detail the story of the active years of one such group, the Free Religious Association. Originating (1866) in a difference of opinion within the Unitarian community of churches (actually the disagreement was whether the Unitarian group should remain a community of churches or should become a Church), the Free Religious Association came to be a loose group of scattered liberal Unitarian and "independent" congregations in various parts of the country. The chief external activity of the Association was the publication of a surprisingly well-circulated periodical, *The Index* (1870-1886), several tracts, and a volume of sermon-essays. In addition, leading Free Religionists contributed many articles to *The Radical* (1865-1872), Sidney Morse's magazine, which was sympathetic to Free Religion, though not affiliated to the Association.

In its composition the Free Religious Association was mixed. Some of the men who helped in its formation were survivors of the transcendentalist movement, and, in particular, the remains of Theodore Parker's old Twenty-Eighth Congregational Society. At the first large public meeting of the Free Religious Association in May, 1867, Ralph Waldo Emerson was the last speaker, and when the membership lists were opened, Emerson was the first to join. Other early members were Quakers, and some came from the group of Progressive Friends in whom Parker had found a sympathetic audience which had stimulated him to some of his last, and some of his best religious thinking. Octavius Brooks Frothingham, transcendentalist and aristocrat of Boston Unitarianism, was one of the first in the fold, and his acquisition "was considered to be worth that of a thousand men" (Persons,

p. 44, quoting W. J. Potter, *The Free Religious Association*, p. 12); Frothingham presided at the first public meeting and described the new fellowship as one "independent of the regularly organized sects in Christendom." Speakers at this meeting included, besides the chairman and Emerson, Henry Blanchard, a progressive Universalist minister, Lucretia Mott, Robert Dale Owen, now in his Spiritualist period, John Weiss, an independent radical Unitarian, Francis Ellingwood Abbot, the outstanding scientific theist, David A. Wasson, transcendentalist preacher and poet, whose "appointed task" was "to be on the alert against assaults on the intuitive philosophy from the side of material science" (Frothingham, *Transcendentalism in New England*, p. 349), and Colonel Thomas Wentworth Higginson, another of the minor prophets of Transcendentalism. It is clear from this listing that the Free Religious Association was a haven for belated transcendentalists.

To stop with this generalization is, however, inaccurate, for the most vital thinking in the organization and the chief editorial activity was that of Francis Ellingwood Abbot. Abbot was a Unitarian clergyman whose chief extracurricular activity was the study of philosophy and the science of his time. He was almost violently anti-transcendentalist in his views and in his publications, from his earliest article on "The Philosophy of Space and Time," which was a realistic criticism of the Kantian position, to his posthumous two-volume work, *The Syllogistic Philosophy*. For Abbot, scientific theism was the philosophy of free religion, a true "way out of agnosticism," and week after week he pounded his view home to the subscribers and readers of *The Index*. One of the values of Persons' book is that there is an attempt to clarify Abbot's position out of his earlier books and the pages of *The Index*. Abbot carried a large section of the Free Religious Association with him in an anti-transcendentalist direction.

A third segment of the Free Religious Association soon after its formation consisted of non-theists. To make room for their entrance, the constitution of the group was amended in 1872; the two chief of those who joined were Felix Adler and Benjamin Underwood. Of these two, Underwood was a confirmed materialist, while Adler held a position closely akin to present day humanism. Adler found that his views were not adequately expressed through the Free Religious Association, and therefore, in 1876, he founded the still active Ethical Culture movement.

While some of the leaders and members of the Free Religious Association found no inconsistency in remaining nominally Christian, the more radical, like Abbot himself, felt that there was a direct opposition between submission to the Lordship of Christ and the yoke of his spiritual kingdom and the assertion of freedom. In Abbot's address on "The Genius of Christianity and Free Religion," originally published in the collective volume *Freedom and Fellowship in Religion,* and reprinted at least twice in *The Index* (a modern reprinting is to be found in my *American Philosophic Addresses, 1700-1900.* New York, 1946, pp. 680-708.), the distinctions which Abbot found between the two faiths are sharply presented. Although Persons is probably correct in asserting (p. 57) that Abbot, "the most systematic thinker of the group, was in many respects the least representative of free religion" as an organized movement, this dictum should be accepted with the caution that it was only by a systematic thinker like Abbot that the full implications of free religion had been thought through, and that, therefore, Abbot's ideas should be taken as those which any thoroughgoing free religionist would have accepted. Abbot was right in his assertion that one religion could not be both Christian and free; those who preferred freedom ultimately had to reject Christianity (or Judaism, in the case of Adler), while those who preferred Christianity ultimately moved back into the radical Christian denominations. The later history of the Free Religious Association proves the correctness of Abbot's view.

The crisis in the affairs of the Free Religious Association came in the early 80's, when it was realized that a strong organization had to be developed if the message of free religion was to be carried throughout the land. In *The Index,* and in its many speakers, free religion had a voice, but it was "a voice without a hand"; to the impossibility of working out a "program which would satisfy the wide variety of dissidents who sought refuge beneath the new banner, each with his own particular grievance and nostrum" (p. 75), Persons devotes considerable attention. He concludes that the concrete activities of the Free Religious Association came to an end in the first World Parliament of Religions at the Columbian Exposition at Chicago in 1893, and that this shows that "the Free Religious Association had made an important contribution to the liberalizing process which had worked deep into religion in the later nineteenth century" (p. 98). To return to my earlier analogy, the support given this minor party convinced the major parties that they

had better pay lip service to the ideal of "common effort to help mankind to higher truth and nobler living" (W. J. Potter, in Free Religious Association *Proceedings,* 1872, p. 15), without sacrifice of their respective creeds. Abbot was most realistic in his criticism of the Parliament of Religions; he noticed that, despite their amicability, the representatives of the various faiths each claimed that his belief had universal validity. He was convinced by this observation that free religion had failed. Its torch, however, was taken up in various places, by various organizations, so that its work goes on.

As an external account of the free religious movement and the Free Religious Association, Professor Persons' account is excellent. It is the work of a competent historian with the ability to restate ideas clearly and exactly. Persons enters into the personal and creedal difficulties of the Free Religious Association fairly and objectively. He has written a good book.

On the negative side of the ledger must be entered the author's apparent inability to participate in the thought he restates. This is especially clear in his treatment of Abbot's relation to the movement. From a historian's view, much of the membership of the Free Religious Association differed from Abbot; therefore he was not its most important figure. The historian of ideas should be prepared to recognize, by imaginative participation in the thought of the movement, that, whatever his immediate influence, Abbot gave the movement its best and truest expression. In passing over Abbot's essay "A Radical's Theology" *(The Radical,* II [1867], pp. 585-87). Persons missed the opportunity to show far more clearly than he does the relation between scientific theism and transcendental radicalism as bases for free religion. There is still room for a thorough study of Abbot which would add to Professor Persons' story, especially on the National Liberal League.

Finally, what should be said about the ultimate possibilities of a religion of freedom? For the failure of the Free Religious Association cannot be the end of attempts to express in spiritual terms the sanctity of the ideal of freedom. First, there are those in the historic traditions who are genuinely and earnestly trying to make their religions vehicles for the celebration of freedom. Through them much good may come; it is only right, however, to repeat the ancient caution, "Timeo Danaos . . ." Their primary interest is in assuring the continuation of their own religions; if in the process, for a time, the ideal of freedom is made

central, this does no harm. Second, there is little chance that any other organized attempt to institutionalize the ideal of freedom will succeed any better than did the Free Religious Association, unless the man and the time should by chance cohere, and the man be one who gives prophetic expression to the ideal of freedom, rather than the type of rational expression given by Abbot. Third, if we of the western world could accustom ourselves to the view that a man might hold to more than one religion—perhaps a cosmic religion, such as one of the historic traditions, and a humanitarian political religion, such as free religion might become—the spiritual values of the two might supplement each other, rather than being in conflict. Whether such a view can gain wide acceptance after so many years of religious exclusiveness is highly doubtful. I am convinced, however, that only on these lines can an attempt be made to develop a large scale religion of freedom.

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Towards Christian Democracy. By SIR STAFFORD CRIPPS. New York: Philosophical Library, 1946. 101 pp. $2.00.

Millions of men and women today, especially in Europe, are being asked, virtually if not forcibly, to choose between Christ and Marx. Christendom is a partisan power. It is one of those situations which no one welcomes, into which men have run blindly and furiously. Intellectually embarrassed, wielding worldly power, the followers of Christ are compelled to take their stand on what seems to many of them the field of Armageddon. Christians as Christians are struggling for power against Marxians as Marxians, and on the outcome of this struggle depends almost everything. It is a crisis which, but a few years ago, very sober historians would have called mythical, and its outcome is anybody's guess. It is one of those world cyclones of faith and hunger which must blow over before social science can resume its academic seat above the grand battle and pass its post mortem judgments. "What shall we think?" in such a situation must wait on "What will we do?"

Into this world crisis comes a series of little, lay sermons by Sir Stafford Cripps, devout, earnest appeals for "Christian action." They are sermons such as no professional preacher could afford to preach—no theology, no history, no learning—candid expressions of simple faith in

"Christ's teachings." They reflect the experience of a man who took part in the work for international peace and co-operation between the Wars, and who, speaking just before the end of the Second World War, takes for granted that the same work on a larger and intensified scale must go on when "peace" returns. Christians, he pleads, must work for the happiness of all peoples. They must not use brutal means, for their proper power is spiritual and moral; they must not become a political party, for their aims are universal brotherhood; they must not work for the Church, for the churches themselves are called of God to self-sacrifice; they must give all to the service of all.

> I should like to hear a new and more practical creed spoken from the heart of every Christian in the world—in terms somewhat like these:—
>
> I believe in the brotherhood of all men, whatever their race, colour, creed or class, as taught by the divine life of Christ, and I pledge myself, without thought of my own interests, to work unceasingly to establish by my daily actions that measure of justice and equality in my own country and throughout the world which can alone form the basis for a happy Christian community of life amongst all the peoples.
>
> I will never give in to the powers of evil or to injustice and inequity, however much I may suffer personally by my resistance. I will fight on ever, here as there, because I believe that thus alone can Christ's Kingdom be established here on earth (p. 90).
>
> The first test in all those actions, whether they are religious, political, social or economic, must be: Are we regarding those whom our actions will affect as human beings, made in the image of God, and as much entitled to consideration, to happiness, to good standards of life as are we ourselves or our children? And this test, quite irrespective of colour, class or creed, flows from our belief in the common humanity of man inspired by the universal divinity of God (p. 84).

There is here no polemic concerning Christianity's historical contributions to democracy, no attempt to portray Christianity as a particular kind of democracy, and no feeling that there are attractive alternatives: "It is comforting to know that our Christian principles are in line with the practical necessities of life, though there should be nothing surprising in this to those who realize that Christianity was taught as a 'Way of Life' " (p. 78).

Such a gospel presents Christianity as *"the* way of life." Not that all men must be Christians, but that all Christians must seek to live in peace and brotherhood with all men. Occasionally in the book there are references to "our common Christian heritage" which sound as though

all Englishmen are supposed to be Christians, but clearly these sermons are addressed to Christians and are intended to arouse them to their *Christian* duty. In other words, whether all democrats are Christians or not, all Christians must be democrats, since "the teaching of Christ" is thoroughly democratic. It seems to make little difference to the author whether democracy is true because Christ taught it, or whether Christ taught democracy because it "is in line with the practical necessities of life."

> What He taught was essentially for the simple people. The importance, to us, of that teaching is that we believe it to have been divine, and therefore beyond question or doubt. There can be no argument as to whether it is right; it is so and must be, because Christ taught it. There can be no question as to its applicability to our lives (p. 70).

The basic conviction, the real point of the sermons is that the power of the Christian way is greater than the power of "materialism"—materialism being conceived as reliance on brutal violence and military government. Men can not live on such terms, but destroy each other. The *only* way of life is *voluntary* service.

There is nothing partisan in this gospel. It is a call to co-operation, not to struggle. It assumes that both Christianity and popular government exist for the happiness of mankind, and that a sincere dedication to both will bring about international peace, government ownership of the means of production, individual security and prosperity. There is a simplicity and finality in this gospel which would convince any reader, I believe, that it is the true gospel of Christ. And it is "comforting to know" that the gospel is still being preached by laymen here and there in its purity, whether or not there be Christians in the world.

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Christian Ethics and Social Policy. By JOHN C. BENNETT. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1946. 132 pp. $2.00.

This slim and modestly presented but weighty volume surveys all the extant answers to its problem and suggests its own solution as a systematic condensation of recent discussion. Its starting point (ch. 1) is the conspicuous addition of social sensitivity to the older religious requirements of personal piety and theological profundity in church life.

The problem (ch. II) is given by the peculiar difficulties involved in deriving maxims of social policy from Christian principles, not only because of the danger of too deep entanglement with corrupting interests on all sides, and not only because of the unavoidable element of evil in every political action, but also because of the technical questions for experts that are part of every political problem, and which the Christian as such is not competent to judge—this point suffices to preclude a Christian program of social policy.

The survey of the four extant strategies (ch. III) finds much to admire in the moral security which the doctrine of Natural Law gives the Catholic, but deems it too optimistic on the freedom from corruption of both reason in fallen man and the interpretation of revelation by the Church. The Quakers', and even more impressively the Mennonites', pacifist strategy in limiting their co-operation with the worldly authorities and thus preserving a life of greater sanctity for members is incapable of generalization, by definition, but may be the best thing attainable in an approximately totalitarian set-up. The liberal identification of Christianity with social progress or social reform has achieved much, but is theologically too naïve and leads to complete secularization; while the opposite Lutheran policy of applying a double standard to public and private life leaves the world un-Christian.

Dr. Bennett describes his fifth strategy (ch. IV), which, he says, is followed by such men as Temple, Niebuhr, and Brunner, by proclaiming "the relevance together with the transcendence of the Christian ethic," in conjunction with "the universality and persistence of sin and the elements of technical autonomy in social policies." The Christian's motives should be grounded in faith and ethics: his decisions should be made in the light of Christian humility and self-criticism: they should not be presented as faultless if they fall short, as they must, of the supreme standard of love, and should be counterbalanced by measures of a different kind designed to mitigate the wrong that may be involved; and maxims and recommendations of different degrees of authoritativeness should help in the making of Christian decisions. The final chapter shows that it is not Christians in general but the Church which is called upon to act and add a dimension all its own to public discussion, because she unites what is divided in the world—unless she succumbs to the divisive forces of the world.

This reviewer has doubts on some details, without questioning the

excellence of Dr. Bennett's reasoning or the wisdom of almost all his illustrative observations on public and international issues. The religious right to revolution is not a monopoly of Protestantism (p. 6); it has been proclaimed and elaborated from St. Thomas on, and particularly by a series of French and Spanish ecclesiastical writers. "Quadragesimo Anno" (p. 38), which the author deems a fascist economic constitution, has been conclusively proved by Catholic students to be perverted and distorted in the fascist constitutions of Italy and Austria. Communist indifference to life and liberty (p. 74) is justified by communists on the ground that only in this way can life and liberty be secured for all time to come—the difference between them and Christians is in their confidence that it depends on their action alone to save mankind. The author's criticism of enlightened self-interest (p. 64) is far too weak—the real interest of the strong always is in victory, not in peace and reconciliation.

The author praises the Fellowship of Socialist Christians (p. 50), of which he is a member, for a circumspect and critical use of socialist ideas; but why then does he subsume that Fellowship under the strategy of identifying Christianity with special programs rather than under the fifth strategy, which knows how to live on both planes and relate them without identifying them? He accepts the separation of church and state (p. 93) without as much as mentioning that it is used to de-Christianize education. He praises the competitive plurality of churches which preludes the danger of monopolistic arrogance (p. 94), but does not reconcile this argument with the accusation (p. 95) that "denominations represent the accommodation of Christianity to the caste system of human society" (Richard Niebuhr). He does not see that, in a completely disintegrated libertarian society, there may be no way to the minimum external integration but by the fascist appeal to physical force—certainly a tragic solution but not necessarily quite irresponsible (p. 76). In the instructive appendix on natural law, the author comes to the conclusion that "Christian moral conviction overlaps with a broader knowledge of the moral order." Niebuhr explicitly endorses this proposition, which has the authority of *Romans* for it. But is it not more correct to say, *anima naturaliter Christiana*?

EDUARD HEIMANN

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Freedom and Order: Lessons from the War. By EDUARD HEIMANN. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1947. 344 pp. $3.00.

The author of this important book, who is dean of the graduate faculty of the New School of Social Research in New York, has brought a wealth of scholarship and insight to the exploration of an age-old problem. That problem is to resolve the conflict between freedom and order in human society. His analysis draws upon philosophy, political science, economics, and religion, and a brief review must be selective in its scope.

The general thesis may be stated on this wise: Freedom and order are in some sense opposites which are always in tension. Social stability requires the establishment of an equilibrium between these two "poles." A dynamic society is always in danger of the encroachment by order upon freedom, with consequent tyranny, and conversely of the destruction of order by an excess of freedom that results in chaos. Yet the two are antithetical only in this dialectical sense, for they presuppose each other, and are mutually dependent. But order and freedom are on different planes of necessity. Order is "more physically necessary, freedom more spiritually so." Since the need for order is more immediately imperative, a conflict at the political level always results in the triumph of order over freedom. This is what happened in the recent collapse of European democracy. And the crisis in which democracy stands today is due to the inability of governments to establish order without the destruction of freedom.

Fascism, Dr. Heimann holds, is mistakenly conceived by both liberalism and socialism. The former regards it as the logical outcome of socialist experimentation; the latter looks upon it as the last stage of capitalism and imperialism. Rather, fascism is a "post-democratic organization of political life." It follows the disintegration of order in social and economic crisis. "What the free people cannot achieve in freedom, they now call upon the use of force to achieve. Fascism is the forcible reintegration of a disintegrated democratic society."

Laissez-faire liberalism also rests on a misconception. "Instead of balancing liberty and order as two separate, interdependent but antagonistic magnitudes, that philosophy proclaims order as a result of liberty." This implies the ultimate reasonableness of men. Such optimism concerning the possibility of a rational order of society fails to take ac-

count of man's "lust, greed, and selfishness." Indeed, "orginal democracy," as represented by Jefferson, for example, avoided this error concerning the adequacy of reason in men, by designing specific institutions designed to curb his darker instincts and force his energy into the direction of the public good." Dr. Heimann apparently does not share the opinion held in some quarters that Jefferson, in the Declaration, gave expression to a romantic conception of man that is absent from the Constitution, with its system of checks and balances. At any rate, the regulative principle which the classical liberals relied on to maintain the balance of freedom and order—free competition—has given way to monopoly, and "the enthusiasm of public opinion for the unattainable aim of restoring competition is tragic."

Socialism, as Dr. Heimann interprets it, is not anti-democratic, as writers like von Hayek and von Mises argue. Rather, it is the "form of democracy in the industrial world" and "parallel to the pre-industrial form of democracy." The latter gave the individual a personal stake in his work through ownership of property; the counterpart of this principle in industrial society is "collective property." Socialist doctrine "correctly assessed the tendencies of the social and economic development." However, the Marxist expectation "that universal large-scale production will make men socially equal and produce that uniformity of society which readily lends itself to socialization" has proved illusory.

The communist alternative, as seen in the Soviet Union, clearly accentuates order at the expense of freedom. On the other hand, the Soviet Union "not only brings the industrial people the right to work, but also the joy of working"; it gives to the peasants security in their holdings, and is "on its way to a kind of pluralistic democracy," without discrimination against racial or religious groups.

The problem of freedom and order, in an age like ours when order has become a primary need, becomes, of course, the problem of power. In the modern secular doctrine of the state Dr. Heimann finds no basis for a solution of it. Its fundamental concept is that of human reason, and it takes no account of the irrationality and sinfulness of men. The bourgeois revolution was indeed an emancipation in terms of spiritual and intellectual liberty, but it also brought "liberty for the exploitation of man and nature, with disastrous consequences for the stability and peace of society."

Dr. Heimann is more explicit in analysis than in prescription, as befits a scholar in a topsy-turvy world, yet he finds an ultimate point of reference in the Christian faith and tradition:

> To balance freedom and give it direction, order must be spiritual. In other words, it must be religious. Taken in themselves, neither order nor freedom have a spiritual direction in them; both are originally neutral needs of man—order physically, freedom spiritually. But freedom, being a spiritual quality, made its programatic appearance in history with a definite sense of spiritual direction, as the freedom of the Christian conscience, which is citizenship in a transcendent world of both physical and spiritual reality (p. 259).

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Modern Trends in Islam. By H. A. R. Gibb. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1947. xiii, 141 pp. $2.50.

The people of the United States are being compelled to consider the crucial position of the Near and Middle East in world affairs. H. A. R. Gibb, the Laudian Professor of Arabic at Oxford, has rendered an important service in this discerning study of modern trends in that religion which dominates the area that is a storm center as well as an outpost. The viewpoint of the author is that of the sympathetic student who interprets his own Protestant faith in terms of general concepts expressed, however, in the symbolic language of the Bible. He perceives Muslim thought and experience as an evolving organism which, however, may be concealed under rigid outward formulas. One feels certain of his disagreement with the famous dictum of Lord Cromer that a reformed Islam is Islam no longer. The modernist movements in Islam have opposed a secularism which would divorce social reform from religion. It is not for Christians to deny to Muslims the right to reinterpret their own convictions in the light of new scientific truth and social changes.

However, Professor Gibb believes that modernism in Islam has largely failed, and that because it has not overcome an aversion to furnishing the creative impulses of the imaginative life with an intelligible direction. Intuitive thought triumphed over rationalism in the early

centuries of Islam when thinkers were confronted with the postulates of Greek speculative philosophy. Philosophy and logic had little meaning for the great body of orthodox Muslims. Probably much of his criticism of this attitude in orthodox Islam might be applied by the author to modern romanticists and intuitionalists who minimize reason.

That tension in religion which is a sign of its vitality expresses itself in Islam in a conflict between transcendentalism and immanentism. While orthodox theologians in early centuries systematized the teaching of the Koran so as to agree with the doctrines of Aristotle and the Neoplatonists, they did not go far enough. Clinging to the Koran's anthropomorphic expressions, they made the otherness of God so stern and unyielding that it was divorced from common experience.

The seemingly inevitable reaction appeared in the mystical movement called Sufism. Al-Ghazâli, in his condemnation of the theologians of the fifth Islamic century and their contentment with the husks of religious knowledge, prepared the way for the growth and development of the Sufi brotherhoods. Three centuries later, Ibn Taimîya headed a violent reaction to mysticism, but this tension soon relaxed and theology once more was reconciled to the Sufi way of life. In the middle of the eighteenth century of the Christian era, Muhammad Abd al-Wahhâb inspired in Arabia a Puritanical desire for reform. He was not only intolerant of saint-worship, the ally of mysticism, but he tried to rid religion of the accretions of centuries from animism and pantheism. This revolt against apostasy within the camp was an example to many other movements, among them those in India against the rule of Mogul, Sikh, and British, that of as-Sanûsi, in Cyrenaica, against the Ottomans and that of Jamâl ad-Dîn al-Afghâni against the infiltrations of European ideas.

The principles of Modernism as evidenced in recent movements for reform are an attempt to bring to bear on education the results of Western science and thought, and an effort to formulate Islamic theology in terms acceptable to modern men. The former has been the feature that marked the work of Muhammad Abduh in Egypt, while the latter is seen best in the writings of Sir Muhammad Iqbâl in India. The statement that "down to the beginning of this century there were no institutions of higher education in Egypt except the college-mosque of al-Azhar and its offshoot, the training college called 'Dâr al-Ulûm' (p.

41) will be challenged by many an Egyptian, since the Faculty of Medicine at Kasr al-Aini, Cairo, celebrated its centennial some years ago.

The modernist program, with all its endeavors at liberalization, is paradoxically concerned with the defense of Islam against Western influence. The old Islamic view of knowledge as a mechanical amassing of facts has not been shaken off. Although they discredit the literalism of the Koran and the miraculous in the traditions, the perfection of the Koran and the personality of Muhammad are implied. The reaction to Christian aspersions on the character of Muhammad has been the creation of a new image of a Muhammad who embodies all the highest virtues. "But," says Professor Gibb, "by their disregard of all objective standards of investigation and historical truth, they have debauched the intellectual insight and integrity of their fellow-Muslims" (p. 77).

In the sphere of practical affairs, modernism in Islam has tried to reform social relationships. In matters involving marriage, divorce, and inheritance, the religious law has long been firmly intrenched, yet it is here that reform is most urgently demanded. Earlier representatives of the feminist movement pressed for removal of social disabilities, but more recently legislation has been proposed to restrict polygamy and limit conditions for divorce. To do this the reformers claim that there should be a radical application of the original meaning of the Koran. The arguments used twenty-five years ago in India by Sayyid Amîr Ali, who was a Shi'ite, are practically universal today in the Sunnite world as a modern solution of the question of polygamy. The verse of the Koran with the proviso, "if you cannot deal justly with all, you shall márry only one," means, they say, that absolute justice being impossible in polygamy, therefore the Koran really teaches monogamy.

In the matter of the Caliphate three alternatives present themselves, a new kind of overlordship, a new spirit of nationalism which accepts the dissolution of the office, and thirdly a revival of Mahdism which believes that truth can be demonstrated by the edge of the sword. The first two seem opposed to the Islamic principle of sovereignty, and the third is fraught with great dangers. The Mahdists, although they are extremists in wanting to bring back primitive Islam, are at one with the modernists in attacking the conservative groups. Yet Professor Gibb believes that "the future of Islam rests where it has rested in the past—on the insight of the orthodox leaders and their capacity to resolve the new tensions as they arise by a positive doc-

trine which will face and master the forces making for disintegration" (p. 122). In general, the modernists have done a profound disservice to Islam. Instead of guiding its thought into creative activity, "they have fastened on it more firmly the shackles of the romantic imagination and encouraged it to interpret history in terms of the capricious impulses of the moment" (p. 127). However, he perceives a few indications that Muslims are gaining an insight into historical method. The task ahead is enormous, but the Muslims themselves must find the way.

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Science and Freedom. By Lyman Bryson. New York: Columbia University Press, 1947. 191 pp. $2.75.

Genuinely important books, as is true of important speakers, rarely if ever use strident tones. The popular books of a period may shock us to attention with all the stridency of an ambulance siren, and be as quickly forgotten. But these others speaking quietly, sincerely, and, most of all, intelligently, somehow insinuate themselves deep inside us, there to do their work sometimes quite unbeknown to us. In this way, almost insidiously, they help to change our attitudes, and thus our habits. *Science and Freedom* is such a book.

Since the beginning of the great revolution which began some four hundred years ago, and of whose implications we are still but dimly aware, there has been a growing necessity for putting intelligence (science) to work in behalf of human relations (society). That it took the atomic bomb to make the issue a political one is not strictly true, for the long struggle to create the Tennessee Valley Authority was essentially that. But it was knowledge of the coming bomb that led Franklin D. Roosevelt to make his urgent plea for a science of human relations, and knowledge of the bomb's effects that led President Truman to reiterate the plea. No doubt it is tragic beyond measure that our behavior should still be so dominated by fear. It is, nevertheless, salutary that we should begin to be so awake to the nature of our necessity as to make it the object of political concern.

Yet the necessity, even when it becomes politically self-conscious, is

one thing. The method of dealing with it is quite another. It is this problem to which Mr. Bryson has devoted himself, and we are all in his debt that he has done so. For though the argument is based on a postulate (as what searching argument is not?), it marches forward with all the beauty of a simple demonstration. And if it is not sufficiently persuasive to those accustomed to more rhetorical appeals, the roaring whisper of its intelligence will carry with it those who try to reach objective judgments on the human predicament.

Mr. Bryson's postulate is that freedom is a basic good, and that our common object should be the establishment of conditions in which human powers may realize human values. Freedom is simply a shorthand expression for those "social conditions in which there are enough normal choices of behavior patterns open to every person to allow for experiment, and change, and diversity. . . ." The test of the conditions is in the living, and they are the best conditions when they best release our creative powers. This, indeed, is the proper aim of a democratic government, and centralization of power is always to be regarded with suspicion because, in the name of efficiency, it curtails the possibilities of responsible and creative participation.

Now we have hampered ourselves in attempting to establish the most suitable conditions by permitting all kinds of extraneous considerations to enter into the formation of our judgments. The role of science in relation to the problem of freedom is, negatively, to by-pass these difficulties by concerning itself with only those values which are true and false and, positively, to concentrate, in its quest for knowledge, on its proper subject-matter. The proper subject-matter is three-fold: first, the "person," defined as "the single human being considered only as a pattern of habits with a marginal capacity for change, held together by memory"; second, the "institution," defined as "a predictable relation among the predictable behaviors of two or more persons"; and, third, "loyalty," defined as a "relatively enduring emotional tone of approval which attaches the elements of our self-respect to our opportunities for self-expression."

With freedom, then, as our method and our goal, and with science as our most reliable technic of inquiry, we are confronted with the problem of achieving social change, which, in any event, is inevitable, with the least possible violence. If there were such a profession as social engineering, this would be its function, and while the reliance of

the social engineer would not be limited to education, he would utilize education to build habits of free action and loyalties to the institutions of freedom. We are such stuff, in our human nature, as to make this possible, and we can make it actual if scientific means are used to foretell the consequences of our acts.

The beauty of Mr. Bryson's book lies not only in the simplicity and cogency of the argument. It lies as well, in this time of mounting despair, in the valid bases he presents to us for creating a genuinely free civilization. The importance of the book does not consist in the major outline briefed here, though the present reviewer finds it compellingly persuasive. Its importance consists in its dealing directly with its subject instead of talking about dealing with it. We have had a surfeit of those who have talked about how important it is to develop a science of society and to utilize science in human relations. Mr. Bryson is one of the few who, through the bewildering underbrush of evasion, obfuscation, and academicism, are attempting to cut the trail.

JEROME NATHANSON

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American Overture: Jewish Rights in Colonial Times. By ABRAM VOSSEN GOODMAN. Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1947. xiv, 265 pp. $3.00.

Rabbi Goodman's smooth narrative retells in interesting fashion the story of the vicissitudes of the Jews in their struggle for equal rights in the American colonies. Though the style is popular and readable, there has been no sacrifice of accuracy. The details have been garnered from reliable studies and, in many cases, corrected by Goodman's reading of the original sources. Two factors deserve special comment: (1) The author presents both the good and the bad in the character of the early Jewish settlers, though, to be sure, the bad is not emphasized; (2) There is a clear realization throughout the book that the question of Jewish rights is not an isolated problem but is intimately tied to the general attitude toward minorities of all sorts. Thus his treatment gains in breadth and interpretative value.

Rabbi Goodman leaves the date of Jefferson's act for establishing freedom of religion in Virginia in a rather confused state; for the rec-

ord, this act was drafted in 1777, introduced in the legislature in 1779, and adopted (with minor changes) in 1786. Again, it is suggested that voting rights in Massachusetts Bay Colony were reserved "to those whose religious doctrines were unimpeachable" (p. 14). The fact is even narrower than this suggestion; in early Massachusetts Bay, only those had voting rights who, by virtue of their "election" by the free and arbitrary grace of the unpredictable Calvinist God, were members of the church. Finally, the author's surprise at the tolerant spirit and the absence of sectarian religious instruction at the Baptist College of Rhode Island (later Brown University) would be modified, if not completely exorcised, were he to read further the magnificent record of the struggles of American Baptists for the fullest possible development of Amrican liberties.

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AMONG THE PERIODICALS

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